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
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PATRIOTISM AND RELIGION



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PATRIOTISM AND RELIGION

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TO
THE GRADUATES AND UNDERGRADUATES
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
WHO ARE NOW EXEMPLIFYING THE PATRIOTISM OF
DEMOCRACY ON THE BATTLEFIELDS OF FRANCE

PREFACE

These lectures were delivered at the University of North Carolina on the McNair Foundation in May, 1918. They cannot claim to be an exhaustive discussion of their theme, but they at least express an attitude of mind. It may be that they may hearten some of those who, without abating their devotion to the cause of international peace, have been forced by the course of events to see no possibility of attaining that goal until the world is delivered by war from the menace of German imperialism. At all events they are a sincere attempt to estimate two of the spiritual forces that underlie social evolution. If I have not dealt at length with the economic and geographical factors of history, it is because I believe that economic determinism fails to account for human progress and makes a sorry showing as a final explanation of the titanic struggle in which the world is engaged.

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PATRIOTISM AND RELIGION

LECTURE I

THE KINSHIP OF PATRIOTISM AND RELIGION

Several years ago in company with a young Swedish naval officer I stood watching a squadron of American warships in the harbor of the Piræus. Without any intention of giving offense he suddenly remarked, "I don't think your flag is very pretty." Such an estimate had never occurred to me, but I tried to look with dispassionate eyes upon the Stars and Stripes and to summon a detached æsthetic judgment. I failed. My country's flag would not permit detached judgments. Patriotism refused an excursion into æsthetics.

The flags of nations are not pieces of bric-a-brac. They are symbols. The tri-color of France, the union jack of Great Britain, the *schwarz-weiss-roth* of Germany, are not mere pieces of cloth independent of the nations they represent. Detach ourselves as best we may, we cannot escape the partialities of patriotism. In these days, with

the fresh memory of the Western Front, one does not need to be an Englishman to know the meaning of Browning's "Home-Thoughts from the Sea":

"Nobly, nobly Cape Saint Vincent to the North-West died
away;

Sunset ran, one glorious blood-red, reeking into Cadiz Bay;
Bluish 'mid the burning water, full in face Trafalgar lay;
In the dimmest North-East distance dawned Gibraltar
grand and gray;

'Here and here did England help me: how can I help
England?'—say,

Whoso turns as I this evening turn to God to praise and
pray,

While Jove's planet rises yonder, silent over Africa."

Yet in times of peace many a good patriot has discounted national loyalty. He has elevated criticism into a supreme duty. As we look back across the years of tragedy through which the world is now passing, we hardly recognize the political attitudes of half a generation ago. Viewed through the atmosphere of a conflict which strains the resources of our nation, the political literature filled with the hypercriticism in which we once rejoiced argues a mood of mind as foreign to these days as if it belonged to the men of Mars. In that far distant world at peace American in-

tellectuals prided themselves on being superior to national enthusiasm. Impatient of Fourth of July oratory and steeped in the political thought of Germany, they compared the faults of our democracy with the efficiency of an autocracy, failing to see that most of our faults are the price we pay for our liberties. Criticism of government, political institutions, national habits; contempt of national pride as jingoism, were all but universal. To be a patriot was to be a critic. The words of Adams and of Patrick Henry, the daring sentences of the Mecklenberg Resolutions and the Declaration of Independence, were regarded much as modern novelists look upon mid-Victorian literature.

This self-criticism was by no means insincere, I am not ready to say it was wholly unwarranted. But the startling characteristic which emerges from the recollection of this former patriotism of ours is its coldness. We thought sentiment beneath our dignity. Political pessimism had become fashionable. True, we believed in justice and, as events have proved, were ready to make sacrifices to give justice, but there was no catch of the throat, no break of the voice, as we set forth our national ideals.

To-day the eyes of our understanding have been opened. We have learned to see that much of that sophisticated criticism of American and Anglo-Saxon institutions was born of a malignant political philosophy which had been implanted within our intellectual life. Liberty then forgotten at the shrine of a new god, Teutonic Efficiency; democracy then openly challenged to prove its right to exist; are again ideals for which men dare to die. The patriotic songs we had all but forgotten, the salute to the flag we had never practiced, are now tests of loyalty to a land that rises in splendid personality. We have come to see that our nation is more than a group of people existing under one government within definite boundaries. It is ourselves, yet more than ourselves. It is a glorious super-person, possessed of virtues, power, ideals, daring and sacrifice. Legislatures may harbor petty politicians, administrations may be displaced, political parties may be assailed, but our country is our country!

I

As one attempts thus to express the new devotion which has called our nation to arms and has filled America with a militant loyalty, a sense of com-

panionship is at once detected. This passion of service, this readiness to sacrifice health and life for national ideals — what is it but a counterpart of religion?

As we analyze this companionship, points of superficial similarity at once emerge. There is the same symbolism in religion as in patriotism. The rite or the doctrine or the shibboleth is a banner as truly as the Stars and Stripes. If in our critical moods we trace unmoved its history and analyze its purpose, we are bewildered when some one treats it as of no heartfelt importance. It is a rare interdenominational meeting in which one does not hear good-natured raillery at the expense of a rite or doctrine that characterizes one of the religious bodies there represented. Such sallies meet with laughter, but the parties concerned are always a little perturbed. It is disconcerting to have that for which one's fathers died and by which we symbolize a faith turned into a joke. The rite or doctrine in someway focalizes a social relationship that is precious — a source of inspiration, a bond with the past, a challenge to the future. Over against a religious inheritance as over against one's country the individual feels dwarfed. He stands thankful, humble and proud before the land in which he was

born and the church in which he was reared. Doctrines may be rejected, worship may be neglected, priests may be suspected, but when religion is really endangered even a Voltaire will erect a temple to God. Many a man looks across the widening sea of disillusionment that sweeps between him and an earlier faith to find his heart growing tender as he thinks of that faith in which his fathers shared. Hope rises above debate, looking for that dear country, the home of God's elect.

But the deeper kinship of patriotism and religion lies far below passing emotions, and characterizes national policies as truly as the impulses of citizens. In these days as in the past it is a common origin of brutality and idealism, of aggression and sacrifice. To neglect this spiritual element of national personalities is to misunderstand national characters and to prophesy falsely of national destinies. Patriotism and religion alike are the expression of a nation's inner life. If the morale of an army is a key to victory or defeat, the national soul is the explanation of national futures and international struggles.

Patriotism and religions are both the product of social history. There can be no individualistic patriotism and no anti-social religion.

What is patriotism? I have asked many persons, to be given answers which though apparently various were at heart the same. To one man America was worth every sacrifice because it gave opportunity to men like himself to pass from poverty to education, prosperity and influence. To another patriotism stood for love of national institutions. To another it was loyalty to ideals embodied in the national history. I came across in a little high school magazine a poem by a young friend of mine, Lieutenant Walter S. Poague, now fighting in France, that puts the human side of patriotism so simply and sincerely that I quote a few of its verses:

My native land! Your shores sink low
 Into the hazy sea,
 Which widens to the shiver,
To the steady, pulsing quiver
Of the ship which takes that dear loved land
 From me.

My native land! What does that mean,
 That phrase, to me?
Not power most of all,
Nor even liberty,
Nor wealth, nor fame,
Of honor brightly kept;
Not the high title of democracy,
Of refuge, haven,
The land of even chance.

All these may mean America, my native land,
To others.

But just to me it means
The little house beneath the elms
Where I was born,
And played on brittle autumn days
At soldier with my dog.

My native land!
You don't mean great high phrases,
But just these simple things which go
To make my home.
And how I love you!
More greatly
Than I ever dared to hope,
I love you, dear America
Of mine.
And if great sacrifices
May be asked of me,
I'll give them happily
To you,
My own dear native land.

In this appealing picture of a young man's love of his land is a better working idea of what patriotism really means than in many a more labored discussion. It is clearly not without the larger vision of that for which a fatherland stands, but its personal identification with a nation's life leads directly to that which is in the heart of every patriot — the sense of proprietorship in a nation and that for

which a nation stands. To the larger import of this sense of unity we shall repeatedly recur. At present I desire less to analyze than to describe the attitude.

Loyalty to a nation is not theoretical and voluntary. It is filial. Our nation is our *fatherland*. Perhaps that is why it is so difficult to take on a new patriotism. Love for step-parents is learned, not inherited. Criticism of one's family is much like an attack upon one's self. Sensible parents are convinced of unaccountable imperfections in their children, but the protective instinct of parenthood comes immediately to the fore when neighbors complain of these imperfections. It is not so much that parents refuse to face the disagreeable truth about their children as their incapacity to believe it when it is told them. The solidarity of the family rebels at whatever threatens it. To say that one's father or mother or sister or wife told one such and such a thing is immediately to close discussion as to the truthfulness of the thing told. The statement itself has been built in to the mystic something we call *our* family.

How similar this is to the sense of proprietorship we have in our country. A young Frenchman who was landing at New York was asked what city he

thought was the most beautiful in the world. "St. Malo," the young man promptly replied. "I was born there."

Is this not also true of religion? There too we find an analogy with our family life. There is no need of recalling how the mystics have carried eroticism to unbelievable lengths in order to express the fellowship of the soul and its God. The language of religion abounds in family terms. Gods are all but universally fathers and mothers. Practices and symbols of certain religions which seem to us hideous profanities of the arcana of life are to many the expression of faith in divine paternity and maternity.

Our social heritage makes this persistence of the family feeling in patriotism and religion all but inevitable. For when we trace civilization back to its beginnings, and move from the developed to the primitive social life of man, we find the family the center of whatever religious and political activities may have existed. The head of the family was both priest and ruler. True, by his side there were generally the medicine men, the witch doctors, and the seers. But they did not efface the religion of the family. The head of the family gave his name to the tribe, and stood as the priest, or at least as the

leader of the worship of those who bore his name. He led in war and in sacrifice. His enemies and his god were family possessions.

When primitive customs yielded to more complicated economic life, the family still dominated social and religious action. The children of Abraham were the children of Yahweh. Family loyalty remained the basis of society and the center of religious practices. The head of the family was supreme because he was the head of the family. His sons might marry the daughters of other families, but they made them members of his own. In war his family and his slaves followed him unhesitatingly. An injury to one of them was an injury to him. To call upon his name was to invoke his protection. Blood feuds sharpened the distinction between the group of which he was head and all other groups. His grazing land was held by the preëmption of family rights, and such property as was his was to be shared by all those who called him father. When he worshiped, he worshiped not only for himself, but for his tribe. When he died, his successor carried on a family history and a family religion.

Nor did this identification of religion with family and state disappear with primitive society. Class-

ical religion knew nothing of the distinction the modern world finds between church and state. In Greece and Rome politics and religion were phases of a common spiritual life.

II

A second element of kinship between patriotism and religion is loyalty to a "beloved community." Just because one finds oneself a part of a national or religious group does one hear the call to service and utter the cry for help. No state however simple has lacked this quality, and no definition of religion is true to facts that overlooks the fundamentally human sense of participation in the life of a group to which even one's god belongs. Religions break with magic at this point. For religions, as distinct from religion, are efforts to build up social practices of such a sort as will make the super-human power or powers upon which a group believes itself dependent, helpful. The identification of the divine purpose with the group-will has always been natural. The god was the group's god. He shared in its experiences, rejoiced in its success and sorrowed in its misfortunes.

When families, grown large, formed a clan or

tribe the sense of unity born of common descent and of common worship expanded. If a tribe took new members to itself, as in the case of Ruth the Moabite married to a Hebrew, the land and god became the clan and the god of the newcomer. There was a tribal exclusiveness in religion as truly as in descent. However slight might be the political unity that bound these tribes together, this sense of unity of ancestry and of deity made a community of spirit. To break a union of clans meant the break of the community of worship. To break religious unity meant, as in the case of Jeroboam, to break tribal confederacies. Throughout history states have found at least partial unity in the worship of the god of their political ancestors. Even the Greek cities could federate to support the cult of the Delphian Apollo.

When tribes through conquest built themselves into conquering peoples, the worship of a common deity became even more a phase of national loyalty. Other gods might be added, but they were conquered gods, gracing the triumphant progress of the god of the victor. Laws were sanctioned by the deity. Human nature became so standardized that there was practically no exception to the rule that submission to military overlordship meant sub-

mission to the deity who had made victory possible. Kings derived their authority not from the consent of the governed, but from the authority and power given them by some god. Hammurabi organized the laws of Babylon in the name of the great god who enabled him to beat down his enemies, and who in his own opinion and that of his people, was regarded as his father. The laws of the Hebrews were the laws of their god Yahweh.

In all nations which have shown military prowess and political unity has there been this extension of the family authority to the king and god. The Assyrian monarchs, the legendary founders of Greece and Rome, the Pharaohs of Egypt, the emperors of China and Japan alike have based their sovereignty upon the divine descent. Alexander came forth from the temple of Ammon the son of Ammon. Loyalty to rulers has thus been identified with loyalty to their god. The rebel and the enemy were not merely political offenders. They were enemies of a god. The brutality of conquest, massacres, deportations, terrorization of conquered people, have all been attributed to the prowess and the will of a national god.

Few indeed were the great rulers of antiquity about whose birth miraculous legends have not

gathered. Such legends were the ancient equivalents of a genuine patriotism. And when these were lacking, obsequious subjects attributed to the emperor, as in the case of Rome, divine qualities. The power which the Cæsars possessed was so enormous and so unrestrained as to compel identification with divine prerogative. "Come see how a god dies," said the hard-headed Roman emperor as he stood upright waiting his final moment. Throughout the conquered nations rose altars to men who exercised from Rome a control that seemed too great for mortals. To refuse to sacrifice upon these altars was no more atheism than disloyalty.

Nor need we look to distant periods for this reliance upon the deity as the source of sovereignty. In the struggle which marked the rise of modern European monarchies a form of semi-deification is to be found generally. The advocates of the divine right of kings, it is true, shrank from attributing divine paternity to their sovereigns, but they did not hesitate to teach that the sovereignty of the monarch was derived from God. The early struggle between English democracy and Stuart absolutism was not merely political. It was a struggle against a king who claimed by divine right to be head of the church as well as head of the state. To claim in-

dependence in religion was to argue disloyalty to the state.

In most recent times we see the struggle renewed. The constant appeal of Germans to the German God, their "Old Ally," is survival of the same belief that the sovereign is the representative of God. "Never will I let a sheet of written paper," said Frederick William IV, "come like a second Providence between our Lord God in Heaven and this land, to govern us by its paragraphs." In Germany as in Babylon the outcome is brutality. The identification of the sovereign's will with the will of God has justified massacre, deportation, terrorization. The continuity of history between the German God and the ancient tribal god is unbroken. The religious leaders of Germany are taught to speak in the name of God when they publish the policies of the Kaiser. The German nation is the nation of the "old German God." It is a German God, the Kaiser declares, who goes with the German armies into Belgium and northern France. It is a German God who is praised for the miseries inflicted upon Serbia and Poland. It is a German God who is worshiped when life and property, human happiness and the control of other peoples are trampled under foot. To doubt his presence is to violate religion as truly

as patriotism. "We are all aware," says *Die Friedenswart* (February, 1916), "that our great general [Hindenburg] prepares his plans in collaboration with God. He is in constant communication, not only with the different bodies of troops, but also with the supreme Arbiter of Battles, with the King of Kings who dwells in the heavens above. This is why God is with him and gives him success." German patriotism is as truly identified with official German religion as was the pride of Sennacherib with the praise of Marduk. The state is the object of religious loyalty. "We can — it may sound strange, but it has its deep meaning," says Pastor Lehman, "we can say: We love our earthly Fatherland so much that we gladly barter our heavenly for it." "Germany is the center of God's plans for the world."

III

This community of history shared by patriotism and religion has naturally expressed itself in religious conceptions. Religion, insofar as it has been reduced to formulæ, has always been a super-patriotism. Theology has been a super-politics. All but universally the relations of God and hu-

manity have been set forth in the terms of the state.

Such an exposition was normal and inevitable. The higher values of life have always been expressed in the language and conceptions taught by the greatest experiences of life. Language has gained its power by transcendentalizing the terms of simple experience. One needs only a superficial knowledge of philology to see how words which have had their origin in concrete and commonplace experiences have been by a process of analogy extended into fields which lie beyond these experiences. The most abstract words of our dictionaries are really hieroglyphs. What is "attention" but the stretching of the mind towards something? What is "metaphysics" but that which is above the physical?

Thus it is not strange that religious thinking is based upon the practices of a monarchical state. It is indeed only one phase of a universal mental process when men speak of God as Father and King; of a nation as his children; of misfortune as his punishment; and of happiness as his reward. As social life developed it was inevitable that the creative social minds which were finding expression in new political forms and institutions — imperialism, feudalism, nationalism — should have used the

terms of the state in which they expressed their highest relations of life, for the expression of the relations of religion. That these should have been drawn from monarchy is also only what we should expect.

In the Hebrew religion this has been particularly true. No religion has so consistently worked out its concepts in the laboratory of politics. One has only to recall the great words of Hebrew theology — most of which live on in Christian theology — to realize the truth of this statement. God was a sovereign who gave his laws. To keep these laws was to be assured of the good will of the sovereign; to violate them was to be equally assured of his enmity. Across the future loomed the great Day of Yahweh in which punishment should be inflicted upon those who had been disobedient, and prosperity should be assured those who had been loyal to their God.

In later Judaism these thoughts became tinged with the national desire for revenge. The Jew of the first century and a half before and the first century and a half after Christ, chafed under the domination of a succession of world powers which not only denied the supremacy of Yahweh but also crushed his people. The national heart was hot

with the desire to avenge this oppression and to establish the Jewish nation supreme over all the world.

In the minds of many Jews such a reversal of conditions meant only revolution. The god of the nation, so the Zealots argued, would certainly prove to be a deliverer if once the nation faced the alternative of complete destruction or deliverance. And so the Jewish nation revolted, only to find that its sovereign God did not deliver it from the sovereignty of Rome.

But other Jews were less ready for the direct action of revolution and looked forward to the time when Yahweh through miracle would make the nation the master of the world. The numerous apocalypses to which these three centuries gave birth set forth in symbolic terms this hope of national deliverance and national revenge. King Yahweh would make his people triumphant; his representative, the One Anointed to do his will, would establish his capital at Jerusalem, and all the world should be his subjects. Judea's enemies should suffer incalculable pain in return for the sorrows they had caused, while all the Jews, even if they had to be brought up from Sheol and given new bodies, would

share in the glory of world domination and the sight of the sufferings of their enemies.

This is the messianic hope which beat in the hearts of all loyal Jews; a hope that was as religious as it was political; in which angels conquered devils as well as men; and in which hell with its abyss of fire would welcome angels as truly as men. Jewish messianism was a transcendentalized hope of national supremacy, a religious faith eager for human and divine brutality, an ancient forerunner of the Teutonic confidence that its Old Ally, God, will give power to the German people to crush its enemies, terrorize them by indescribable brutalities, and spread over the world Teutonic *Kultur*.

This messianic program was the mold into which the early Christians ran their faith. Jesus himself repudiated its militaristic quality, declaring that the true Deliverer would be greater than a militaristic son of David, that the King is a father rather than a conqueror, that the triumph of His will will come when men love even their enemies, and they become His real sons not by ruling over a crushed humanity but by possessing that spirit of love which is possessed by their Father in heaven. But the early Christians could not so understand

Him. As Jews they kept their Jewish hopes. Convinced that Jesus was the Messiah of their hopes, they looked for the kingdom to be restored to Israel. When Jesus tried to make them see that he, the revelation of the Father, would suffer ignominy and death rather than gain control over human lives by appeal to force, they were silent and afraid. When their faith in his imminent triumph sprang anew, they thought of him as returning from heaven as the judge rather than the brother of mankind, of his coming as the Day of Yahweh in which they would achieve individual blessing and national supremacy. Paul sufficiently sympathized with Jesus to realize that the new era would not be an era of Jews but of those of every nation who accepted Jesus as their Lord; yet even Paul did not free himself entirely from his Jewish chauvinism. The salvation which was daily nearer, the day of the Lord which was about to dawn, waited for the conversion of the Jewish people and was described by him in terms of the law court. The Christ was to sit on a throne which was to be a judgment seat. Salvation was to follow acquittal, and the Kingdom of God was to be a heavenly state in which the wrath of God was to confound all His enemies.

Such a program for a transcendentalized nation to

be founded by Jesus in his miraculous return in the skies became the vertebral column of Christian thinking. It, rather than the noble moral system of Jesus and Paul, found its way into the creeds. The hope of the church was expressed in the language of the state, and martyrs died, not to express a hope in a humanity lifted above passions of revenge into a divine fraternity, but because they believed in a triumphant Christ who should establish his reign upon earth. The morality of Christians was to be the conduct of those whose citizenship was in heaven.

The system of theology which constitutes so large an element of the ecclesiastical doctrine of both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism was completed by Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle, the Bible, and the church furnished him materials. The great rubrics of his teaching were not metaphysical but political. Human experience in politics was lifted into the higher air of philosophy. The political practices of his day were transformed by the use of Aristotelian philosophy into the principles of the Christian religion. Theology became a super-politics; and religion became a super-patriotism that sought its ideals in service to the God of Heaven. Christians became heirs of the Other World, human life a pilgrimage through a world of misery to the

Heavenly City, and salvation a retreat from a lost humanity.

IV

Nothing was easier for this orthodoxy of the church than to express itself as a patriotism which centered about a divine monarchy. But a different situation arises in the days of democracy. Here we pass into a creative rather than an inherited patriotism. What fellowship has democracy with religion? Can it too, as the mood of a social mind, give form and terms to religious thought? Can theology describe a divine super-democracy?

Democracy is more than a term. Social questions cannot be answered by definitions, after the method of the Schoolmen. They thought that if they could define a word, they had the thing for which the word stood. The term democracy is subject to these general observations. If you treat it as a mere word, you may define it so as to get almost any sort of program. If you treat it as a picture that symbolizes actual social experiences, you get something distinct and historical. It is in this latter way that it must be used. Religion and politics to-day do not face academic definitions, but actual social development, recognized institutions, a demolition of

precedents and a general creation of new attitudes and aptitudes in society.

Democracy is more than an ideal. It is a discernible development of institutions. As such it should be regarded historically, not theoretically. And as a development of institutions it has not been symmetrical in different nations. In practice democracy must be described as the development of the rights of Englishmen into the rights of humanity. That which the Englishmen claimed as rights in England, our intellectual and idealistic development has made the basis of our conception of whatever democracy we actually enjoy. Not programs but genetic development has been the method by which such democracy as the world actually possesses has become the precious heritage of humanity. We are at war to preserve a real world in the making, not a Utopia that men have dreamed.

This actual democracy has been largely outside the range of economics and within the range of politics. The founders of the American Republic were not concerned with economic democracy. In fact, it is probable that if they had thought of it, they would have bitterly opposed it. To think of productive wealth in a collective fashion was something that obviously they never dreamed of. And this

conclusion is enforced by the fact that they left in the American Constitution economic factors some of which plunged the nation into civil war, and others which are at present serving as the basis of a federal paternalism. What the future may have in store for a democratized world we cannot foretell. But in the light of our past experience we must believe that the process of extending popular rights by extending privileges enjoyed by some favored class, will continue. Already its direction is becoming apparent. Political rights inevitably involve economic rights.

We are apt to forget the concrete if limited character of the only democracy the modern world has enjoyed, and to speak as if, like the Idea of Plato, democracy somewhere existed complete and approachable. I remember once hearing a young Jewish girl who had fled from Russia, severely criticize the restraints of America. The sort of thing I fancy she had in mind was not the actual liberty she had never enjoyed till she came to America, but the sort of Paradise bolshevikism undertakes to produce by the transfer of autocratic control from the Czar to the proletariat. Russia like France under the Mountain is suffering from the democracy of program.

Sometimes men speak of the democracy of Germany. There is no democracy in Germany in the sense that there is a democratic movement in Anglo-American history. The very Socialism of Germany is not democratic. The political development of Germany has consciously been opposed to that which has characterized the Anglo-Saxon stock. The heart of Anglo-French and Anglo-American democracy is this: the people as such control their government, the authority of the state resides in the people, and sovereignty lies in the people and not outside the people. That conception sharply differentiates the development of the British, French, and American democracies, and most constitutional monarchies from the Germanic institutions. The heart of the Anglo-American representative democracies is that a government derives its authorities and sanctions from the people governed. It is the executive committee of the people themselves. The heart of the German conception is that the government derives its authority from God and not from the people. The democracy of England, America, and France has been worked out in revolutions in which the people dared face an oppressive government. Indeed, practically all constitutional governments have been born of peoples who dared revolt rather than

lose their rights. The German blood of all Europe has never accomplished a successful revolution. Face to face with their government Germans have always quit the struggle for popular rights. German patriotism has never centered about the rights of individuals. There has never been a German democracy because Germans have never cared enough about democracy to organize a revolution.

This difference in political loyalties explains differences in the religious attitudes of autocracies and democracies. Democracy in America was the child of religious liberty. Professor Jellinek of Vienna has shown the influence of this independent movement in the colonial churches of America upon the idea of the development of the rights of man. He traces back the succession of the Declarations of the Rights of Men and Citizens which appeared in the latter half of the eighteenth century to the religious organizations and institutions of New England. And it is, I think, beyond question that the underlying forces of political democracy working through the English experience of the seventeenth century were deepened and given spiritual thrust by a religious democracy. Democracy in the church came from and gave new meaning to democracy in politics. German Christianity has not had that line of

development because Germany had no democracy to make it possible. The control of the church by the German states makes actual religious democracy, that is, the popular control of the church, impossible. It is not there, it never will be there, so long as democracy is not there. Because the Lutheran church has been a creature of politics it has never founded a democratic state. German Protestantism has been democratic only in non-German democracies.

Democratic development has appeared in church organizations but seldom if ever in religious thinking. Looking at actual history, no theological system has expressed the fundamental passion and ideals of this Anglo-American democracy. Democracy even yet has not supplied actual constructive theological data or rubrics. Yet it has not been without influence. Negatively, it has served to weaken certain theological conceptions. Wherever, for example, there is a real democracy the discussion of the sovereignty of God has grown faint. We very properly speak of God and His laws, but people filled with the spirit of democracy are not much concerned with conceptions of the sovereignty of God born of political formulas. Democratic influence has all but ended discussion of foreordination and

election. Hundreds of years ago, before the leaven of democracy had worked in human experience, men had very much concern about such doctrines. Recall only the Synod of Dort and the execution of John of Barneveldt. Men influenced by democratic ideals believe in the power of God and the purpose of God, but they draw the description of such attributes from the field of science. Natural law rather than legal statutes is their symbol of God's will. They have not yet sufficiently expressed democracy in their social life to be able to think instinctively of God from the point of view of democracy, but every new struggle for the extension of democracy makes such thought more inevitable.

We say, and I think very properly, that one cause of the failure of our inherited theology to inspire the modern world is because it was incubated in a period of monarchy where there was no religious liberty, that it embodies autocratic ideals, and that it therefore no longer is in functional relation with the modern mind. Every dominant creed was the product of a social mind that had not been touched by the ideals of liberty. If it had been so touched it would not have made a creed to which men would be required to conform. Creeds and confessions were organized in no small way for the purpose of

keeping heretics out of the church and for making trouble for people who did not accept them. That purpose is the fruit of ecclesiastical autocracy, not of democracy.

The real expression of democracy in religious thinking is outside the field of orthodox theology. We can no longer think of God as spatially separate from the world of action. He is with us till the end of the age. Most of the constructive work now being done in the field of theology is by way of extending Christian principles into social justice. By the process of social reconstruction where democracy is working, lives are being fired with the conviction that human beings have value as men and women. The creative theological thinking of the past twenty-five years has been done by men of the new patriotism — men in sympathy with the social movements of the day. To them God is not an absentee monarch, but the inner Life of the universe expressing His will in nature's forces and the growing morality of the group-will. All recent books of theological significance have belonged to that new region into which prophetic souls are entering. where we have learned to see men and women as persons; where we have learned to see that they have rights; and where we are learning to give them and

get them justice. Only where the spirit of democracy is working is there creative religious thinking. Only there is the union of the patriotism and the religion of to-morrow. For in democracy alone can the immanence of God be expressed in the terms of human experience.

V

When one thus considers the historical kinship of patriotism and religion, it is seen to be something more than an inheritance. It is psychological. Each is a complementary aspect of the same mood of the social mind. Loyalty to one set of political institutions involves loyalty to a conception of religion, both positively and negatively. From such a point of view the world-war gains an even more tragic aspect. It is not merely institutions, histories, and governments that oppose each other in the persons of millions of men seeking to kill one another, but two types of patriotism and two types of religion. On the one side is a religion which is the servant of the state; on the other is a social order that is already finding its way into a religion that promises light and freedom for the human soul. Nations and social institutions fight from the North

Sea to the Indian Ocean and with them two conceptions of Christianity. The patriotism of contending nations has been identified with their religious development. The issue involves not merely world markets, colonies, places in the sun, freedom of the seas. Besides these are a new future for democracy and a religion worthy of democracy. When peace comes it will find the world freed of the fear of a modern Sennacherib praising his tribal God; assured of opportunity for the development of a spiritual life in which justice shall be advanced between individuals and nations and the religion of Jesus shall inspire and direct social evolution. Patriotism and religion will be the expression of a creative social mind, no longer monarchical or feudal but democratic, more bent on giving justice than on national growth through annexations and indemnities, worshipping a God who is a Father of rather than a God of battles and of conquest.

LECTURE II

THE MORAL VALUES OF PATRIOTISM

A nation is more than a group of people living under a government and occupying a certain area. Of this we are sure. Yet just how to define the word lies beyond our power. Nationality is as shy of definition as life itself. In some cases it seems to express a common descent and inheritance of the same customs; but some who, like the Slavs, share such descent and inheritances, have no political unity. Sometimes, as in the United States, it is the expression of political unity with no community of origin. Sometimes political history, origin, and community of cultural inheritances go to make up national feeling, as in the case of France, England, and Japan, although even in these countries each population may be traced back to different ethnic stocks. Modern nations have their history, but they themselves are more than history. In them all there is the plus element which for lack of a better term may be called a national spirit. As President

Faunce has so well said, "Nationality is a collective memory and a collective hope." Yet when we undertake to analyze and describe this spirit we find ourselves again involved in a maze of forces crossing and recrossing one another, by no means easy to combine either in logic or in fact.

In treating of a nation we thus have to deal with an entity which is more or less logically arbitrary, but virtually real. It is more than a form of government. France, as example, for centuries slowly evolved from a group of feudal states at last to find a unity in a constitution. But France to the Frenchman — and nowadays to the world! — stands for something vastly more than a political unity. It has a place and a mission in the world to which its government is almost incidental. Similarly in the case of Germany. The German Empire as a political unity is vastly less important than *das Deutschtum*.

So it comes to pass that loyalty to one's nation is far more inclusive than loyalty to one's government. True, when, as in the case of Germany, a government is set forth as the state and makes its own ambitions and policies a national program, it becomes the object of loyalty. But the nation, whatever may be its constitutional aspect, is more

than its government. Loyalty to one's nation — or when government is imperfect or lacking, one's people — is the only workable definition of patriotism. On the one side it is a sort of property right in a social inheritance, and on the other side it is an idealistic devotion to the mission which its citizens believe is the duty of a state to perform.

It follows that patriotism gets its highest moral values not from itself as a state of soul. Patriotism no more than sincerity is a guaranty of wisdom. Its moral values are derived from the significance of the nation to humanity. If this significance be morally indefensible, patriotism becomes a menace. If the political, economic, and international policies of a nation tend to establish a better world order, patriotism is an evangel of peace and justice.

I

At the outset of any attempt to estimate the worth of patriotism we are met by the denial of the legitimacy of the feeling itself. Nor is this denial that of the famous — and too often misunderstood — saying of Samuel Johnson, "Patriotism is the last recourse of a scoundrel." It involves the legitimacy of nationalism itself. Radical democracy rejects

patriotism because it is loyalty to a national destiny. The orthodox socialist is an anti-nationalist. The line of cleavage which he would establish runs between economic classes and not between political entities. To that end he would abolish national loyalties. Three-quarters of a century ago Marx proclaimed the revolutionary doctrine that patriotism and a sense of national unity are the survival of a doomed bourgeois order, a superstition born of the deception of the proletariat in the interest of their subjection to the bourgeoisie. In its place he would have established an internationalism based on the world-wide union of workingmen. From the point of view of Marxian socialism, fraternity is identical with a united proletariat and the breaking down of national units. Just how this world wide unity of the working classes is to be accomplished, just what the future is to substitute for nations, socialism has not ventured to set forth in any thoroughly constructive program. It is content for the present to emphasize the negative side of progress and to seek the destruction of existing social and economic institutions, relegating social reorganization to social revolution itself. Theoretically, therefore, orthodox socialism is opposed to war and to nationality as the great dangers to proletarian solidarity.

All this, however, with two outstanding exceptions. The first exception is that of the bolshevik socialism of Russia. How far this movement has been financed by Germany is still a matter of conjecture. At all events it has helped Germany beyond calculation. Its champions, however, are consistent Marxians in their pacifism. They have naïvely sought to attach to themselves the working classes of Germany and Austria, and have brought about a national debacle under the guise of proletarian solidarity. Their red flag flying above their embassy in Berlin is a flaunting of a fatal internationalism in the face of anti-democratic autocracy. Universal democracy as truly as Russia is paying the fearful price of the effort of idealistic sheep to convert materialistic wolves. Brest-Litovsk is the appalling *reductio ad absurdum* of anti-nationalism. Promises of a socialist utopia have been fulfilled in German conquest. For German socialists of the majority group, so far from uniting with their bolshevik brothers in a proletarian world-order, have supported the Hohenzollern autocracy.

The second exception is that of German socialists in the United States. Here the movement has been so thoroughly organized by German sympathizers that it has become an outstanding center of oppo-

sition to war by the United States against Germany. Masquerading as opposition to war itself, nationalistic tendencies in Germany have reexpressed themselves among German socialists in the United States. The St. Louis vote of the socialist party has expressed the attitude of Teutonic socialism. Non-socialist Germans in the political campaigns have attached themselves to socialistic opposition to a war with Germany. In their secret propaganda socialists have favored Germany on the ground that the German government is more friendly to the working people than the free government of America! Patriotism has persisted, but it is German and not American patriotism. Those who have been suspected of being leaders of American patriotism have been excluded from socialistic groups. Organized socialism in America has turned itself into anti-Americanism, condemning a war of national self-protection and pleading for peace in speech self-betrayed by its German accent. The situation is too plain to need argument. The loyal socialists of the United States are those who have broken with the socialistic party because they have seen the danger which German success threatens to a democratic movement. The bolsheviki may be sincere; the German socialist of America is disloyal.

This sinister situation can be controlled by the rise of a genuine patriotism which discriminates between a nation where socialism is not democratic, and nations that further democracy without being socialistic.

That international crimes have been wrought in the name of nationalism must be admitted. In the name of patriotism strong nations have oppressed the weak. National pride has given countenance to national aggression and brutality. National egoism made Continental Europe an armed camp and drenched the earth with the blood of helpless peoples. All this and more must be admitted as legitimate charges against nationalism and patriotism of a certain sort.

But it does not follow that nationalism and patriotism of another sort are of necessity evil. All intelligent patriots must have sympathy with many of the ideas which socialist internationalism seeks to embody. But the central aim of socialism, the world-wide solidarity of the proletariat and the abolition of national ties, is a reform against history. The chief elements of modern civilization have been very intimately connected with national groups. Civilization is a compound of nation achievements. Each nation — using that term in a broad sense —

has been a laboratory in which definite cultural ideas have been developed. It is a commonplace that Egypt, Judea, Greece, and Rome, each in its creative national epoch, perfected some cultural element which social evolution has incorporated and placed at the disposal of the entire world. Modern nations just as truly have their contributions to make to world-life. Without the national life the rights of the individual now so outstanding in democratic states would never have come into existence. Personal liberty is impossible without the protection of the state. Differences in state life enable citizens of one nation to possess rights which are forbidden to citizens of another nation. If it had possessed no national life, how would it have been possible for the American state to work out its characteristic contributions to human welfare — the identification of citizenship with the state, the right of private initiative, the equality of opportunity, the elevation of women into full rights of persons, the extension of education, the assurance of religious liberty, the growing recognition of economic freedom and self-direction of the working-classes, the protection of weaker nations, and the regard for international law and arbitration? These inestimably precious advantages have been made possible by national de-

mocracy. To expect a reconstruction of human life into a world-state is to confess subjection to impracticable dreams. The fate of Russian radicalism in its dealing with Germany is a warning against enthusiasm for paper utopias.

Unless history is about to reverse its tendencies it is the nation upon which we must build the future. Universal human welfare will result from coöperative nationalism. Great empires have not been possible since the rise of nations. The Roman Empire was able to produce an extraordinarily efficient type of internal organization and to continue through centuries of warfare because it did not have to face the problems of creative nations. The peoples it controlled had no further contribution to make to history, no traditions for which their citizens were ready to die. It was better for them to enjoy the Roman peace as subjects than to attempt revolt, for they had no national ideals worth fighting for. Only in the case of the little Jewish state was the Roman Empire threatened by a serious revolt. That is to say, there was no worthful patriotism because the nations had ceased to have the power to make contributions to human progress.

When one compares the Roman Empire with the modern world a difference is at once apparent. It

was threatened by no violated nationalism. Napoleon at one time controlled practically the entire Continent of Europe. But he was attempting to control national powers. His empire was short-lived because the inner forces of national life were expansive and yearly increased the strain upon the military unity and control which he imposed. National life was sooner or later bound to express itself in national explosions.

The same thing is more emphatically true now. If it were conceivable that Germany could establish a military empire like that of Napoleon, the rise of national patriotisms would sooner or later usher in a period of rebellion, war, and the reëmergence of national units. We can already see this in the case of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs are struggling for national self-existence. They can, of course, within certain limits be restrained and coerced, for they have no national organization to give direction to ethnic loyalty. But an empire composed of conquered nations would compress national spirit to the point where violent disintegration would certainly result. Militarism can maintain supremacy in a modern world only as long as its masters are without the pale of the inevitable development of popular rights.

A German world-state would fall like any social anachronism.

Admitting, therefore, that there are dangers in patriotism and that nations are as yet competitive groups, we are all the more concerned with the purposes and ideals of nations. The danger of patriotism to the world-order lies in the sort of policies a nation represents. If nationality and patriotism are to be identified with German theories of the state, a German national loyalty will result. Nationality and patriotism are then undoubted evils which ought to be remedied. But a nation composed of persons who regard national welfare as consistent with the welfare of other nations is not a curse. Patriotism that prompts a nation to protect weaker nations from their stronger neighbors and seeks to lead in co-operative effort for the welfare of humanity is the promise of a new and better world-order.

Can patriotism thus be made a coöperative rather than a belligerent virtue? Or in the age which is to come after the war must we expect a development of militaristic patriotism? Will the defeat of Germany mean what the success of Germany would mean? Is the world to become a group of mutually antagonistic political units each seeking its own advantage at the expense of others? Such questions

strike through economics and politics into the substratum of moral character of the nations themselves. On their answers largely hangs our faith in the future.

II

To estimate the relative dangers and advantages of patriotism we must deal with historical tendencies rather than academic definitions. Only by a survey of human experience can we clearly appreciate the worth of the patriotism of democracy.

Patriotism as a loyalty to national ideals is the product of the rise of modern nations. In the Roman Empire there was, it is true, an advance toward this conception in which the state rather than the monarch was the center of loyalty. To be a Roman citizen was to be something more than a subject of the Roman emperor. It was to share in legal privileges and to become a partner in a history that had given birth to law and order as well as to military conquests. In this the national pride of the Roman was different from that of the Greek. Greece, although in Aristotle producing the great philosopher of the state and in the Macedonian Alexander the first man that dreamed of an empire more than military, had no collective memory or hope of

a united Greek nation. In Greece as in the Eastern world men were prouder of their cities than of their country. The Athenian and the Spartan, the Theban and the Corinthian, were ready to say with the man of Tarsus, "I am a citizen of no mean city." But the one no more than the other could recall an imperial solidarity like that which the genius of Rome bequeathed to the Mediterranean basin. In this municipal patriotism there were many things which were noble, and there were incentives to self-devotion; but the failure to achieve a Greek nation prevented that intense love of a national entity which characterized Roman literature and Roman expansion. The Greeks formed colonies which had a high degree of unity of culture, but no national nor imperial unity. The Roman colony was a part of the Roman state. The Roman citizen in Asia or Gaul, in Egypt or Britain, was a member of an ever-present state quick to defend its citizens from danger and to punish those who injured them in person or estate. This sense of solidarity was radically different from the old tribal unity with its blood feuds. It was a genuinely political conception.

But it was possessed of an inherent weakness. It could not inspire national self-sacrifice. In the

days of the Republic Roman citizens were ready to sacrifice and die for their expanding city-state. Under the Empire they hired soldiers to defend their frontiers and lived securely in a disarmed world. The literature of even the Golden Age of the Roman Empire is singularly lacking in that virile note that sounds in the literature of modern states. Vergil appreciated the Golden Age which had come, and uttered his beautiful panegyrics upon Augustus. His successors were equally thankful for the peace which the world could hardly understand, but even in the philosophy of men like Seneca no note of sacrifice, no appeal for political reforms, gives seriousness to their complacency. In the letters of a cosmopolitan like Pliny admiration for the emperor and a business-like discussion of administration give no hint of a readiness to befriend the ideals of a state beyond a keen appreciation of the obligations to maintain order and forestall anything like social discontent.

One cannot help feeling that the history of the later Empire is the outcome of this attitude of mind. The social organization of the Empire based on the labor of slaves, its unwieldy extent, the diversity of component peoples lacking the unifying influence of suffrage, had within it no singleness of soul which

could lead its citizens to a united defense of its institutions. Those centuries of disintegration in which the East split from the West, and the West was dismembered by the incoming of hordes of armed immigrants, might have been foretold by the absence of a genuine patriotism. Pride in one's country based upon the achievements of a government in which one has no part is a poor substitute for a loyalty to ideals which a nation as a whole is believed to embody and champion.

So it came to pass that patriotism even in the Roman sense of the term disappeared from the earth during the centuries which followed the barbarian invasions. Europe reverted to the older local and personal loyalty. The feudal social order that emerged in Western Europe had little of true patriotism in it. There were, it is true, a romantic chivalry, the quick response of vassal and villein to the support of their lord, but in the place of a nation there were countless groups, most of them small, in which life centered around a feudal lord, and social solidarity found its most effective expression in the respect paid the honor of superiors. The so-called Holy Roman Empire which hovered over this feudal confusion never was able to evoke anything like patriotic allegiance. Its theory left no outlook for citi-

zenship, for whatever authority it claimed descended upon it from heaven instead of coming to its emperor from citizens loyal to a state. True, there were the beginnings of ethnic solidarities, but the prevailing political note even in the emerging middle class was municipal rather than national. There was no Italy, or Germany, or France, or, until the middle of the fifteenth century, a Spain. There were kingdoms which, had the course of history run differently, might have developed into nations; but states, and in consequence patriotism, in the modern sense of the word, were lacking.

In one state only can there be fairly said to have been a steady development of a national patriotism, and that state was England. The reason for this distinctive characteristic is not difficult to find. In England the people as such gradually gained a recognizable share in the government of their land. The thirteenth century for a while gave promise of a constitutional monarchy. The fact that this was lost in the struggle between the feudal houses of England and in the all but complete autocracy of the Tudors could only serve to check the development. Englishmen had rights as Englishmen. The English people gradually grew into the possession of a national consciousness. And as the little island

kingdom fought for its very existence against the rich and powerful new states on the Continent, there developed an attitude of mind which was more than the pride of the Spaniard in Spain. It was a sense of national solidarity, of national future, and of national duty. As compared with this English patriotism the contemporary loyalty of Frenchmen and the almost tribal loyalty of the innumerable German states appear of a different order. Nationalities grew on the Continent, but it was the nineteenth century that evolved the quality of patriotism which marks the constitutional states of Italy and France. In Russia the serfs had no nation to which they could be loyal, and the Little Father at Petrograd was an all but mythical figure, loyalty to whom was hardly more than a survival of the tribal loyalty of the past. In Germany there were Prussians, Saxons, and Bavarians. It required time and the blood-and-iron policy of Bismarck to bring into actual expression a public mind that could in any true sense be called German.

When to-day's nations emerged, religious life was identified with this new national patriotism. The reformation produced national churches which served to intensify the exclusiveness of government. Religious liberty was all but unknown. The citi-

zens of England had their state-church, and the same was true of Scotchmen, Irishmen, Welshmen, Prussians, Saxons, Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes. That the state-church tended to produce a national patriotism undoubtedly is true, but it also tended to limit this nationalism both in boundary and in outlook. The citizen was required to show loyalty, not only to his sovereign, but also to his church.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries furnish abundant illustration of patriotism born of egoistic nationalism. In that century it is difficult to discover among the nations any dominant sense of mission of service to the world. It was a period of national expansion. Each nation regarded war as a desirable means of national growth. Conquest was regarded without discussion as legitimate. Each nation grew by taking from other nations such territory and population as it was able to win. The boundaries of different states from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century were constantly changing. A strongly centralized power like France was able to expand at the expense of the smaller states about it. The policy of Louis XIV was that of self-aggrandizement. Wars were made by a ruling family in much the

same way as a modern business house undertakes to absorb the trade of its competitors. The idea of international law, although it had begun to take shape in the works of men like Grotius, possessed little or no influence. Witness the strange negotiations between England and the Dutch Republic. The only loyalty which could be expected of Frenchmen and Prussians was that of obedience to masters over whom they had no control. They were cannon-fodder and tillers of the soil. The absence of constitutional limitations upon the sovereign made it quite impossible for peoples, even had they possessed any definite sense of a common human duty, to express their will. Prussians and Frenchmen could be proud of their victories, but loyalty raised no question of national morality.

What was true of France and Prussia was true of every other nation in Europe. Even in England, where the people had some share in the government, the idea of a morality which was superior to the ambitions of national policy in dealing with the rest of the world was not evident. The Commonwealth under Cromwell, though it had more theology, had no higher sense of national obligation than the absolute monarchy of the Bourbons. Yet the beginnings of a higher patriotism are to be discerned even in

these centuries. For it was then that America began to make its contribution to national idealism.

The organization of English colonies served to lay the foundations for a broader conception of national mission. Although the colonies themselves were jealous of each other, and in some cases engaged in actual war, there were developing within them moral elements destined to lay the foundations both in precedent and in theory for an extension of moral sanctions to national policies. A new and better patriotism was inevitable.

Why the American colonies should be the pioneers in this new field is not hard to discover. They had been established in large measure by Englishmen who had come to the new world for the enjoyment of what they believed to be rights. At home they found such enjoyment limited by the traditions and the institutions of a state in which the power of a king, aristocracy, and church were only partially limited by the popular will. The rights of Englishmen, however, had already begun to acquire a real content. When, as Englishmen sought the enjoyment of still other rights, they were transferred to America they rapidly tended to become regarded as the natural rights of men. The rights of Englishmen gave rise to the doctrines of natural rights.

It seems to be true that when an idea of rights is evolved by some pioneering society it comes as an expansion of rights already partly enjoyed. To expand such rights was the aim of the eighteenth century. The first stage in America and England—the only lands in which popular rights were in any real sense indigenous,—was that of a struggle to acquire and enjoy privileges which were properly the people's, but in actual practice had been monopolized by privileged classes. When, as within the American colonies, there was a practical universality of such rights as properly belong to Englishmen, without the sense of exclusion from the enjoyment of other rights enjoyed by privileged classes, the idea of rights belonging to men as men, was not slow in finding expression. Such development, though aided by the popular philosophy of the day, found largest opportunity for political expression in the American colonies. The compact made by the humble Pilgrims on the *Mayflower* was in germ a modern democracy. But the rights which this compact expressed were those then already enjoyed, though only in part, by Englishmen. And what was thus expressed in something like actual constitutional form in the American colonies was at the same time developing in the political thought of England and

was moving over into the field of French philosophy. That is to say, the idea of rights which had been developing in English history in actual experience was given a theoretical basis and expansion by English philosophers, like Hooker and Locke, and by their followers on the Continent. Political practice and social theory reënforced each other and made possible the era of revolutions in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Wherever during that period any people found itself capable of breaking down the wall of partition between those who had rights and those who sought for them, liberty and political equality became identified with national mission. Here was a new patriotism. This was particularly true in the case of the United States of America and France, the two countries in which a privileged class was declared to be contrary to the fundamental nature of the nation.

III

It is well, however, to keep clearly in mind the difference between the American Revolution and the French Revolution. In America the Revolution consisted in the break with English political control. It involved no social change or destruction of politi-

cal ideals in the colonies themselves. The Constitution of the United States was a codification and institutionalizing of political and social precedents already in existence. The right of the people to control the monarch was already recognized in English politics, although within a limited field. The substitution of popular for royal sovereignty in America had practically been accomplished before 1776, and the achievement of political independence involved no destruction of the idea of sovereignty which thirteen political entities transferred to the Federal Union formed in 1787. The thirteen individual patriotisms were not altogether destroyed, but supplemented, and by the establishment of the indivisibility of the Federal Union in the war of 1861-65 they became fused in a genuinely national patriotism.

In France on the other hand there was of necessity a destruction of political and social institutions. The new national consciousness involved a reorganization of the entire national life. Feudal privileges and the monarchy itself were abolished. The lands of the church were nationalized and distributed among the citizens. The mass of Frenchmen who had had no share in the government were given participation in new national life through suffrage.

Utterly new political institutions were established, destroyed, and reestablished without continuing an earlier course of constitutional development.

In both the American colonies and France the unification of a genuinely national spirit was accompanied by disorders, and in France because of inexperience in self-government by great suffering. But in both alike a political liberty purchased at the expense of revolution gave to the people a sense of national mission which has never been lost. They were patriots who were loyal to a nation that had ideals that other nations needed. Both felt that they possessed the duty of inducing other nations to establish for themselves the state of affairs which revolution had brought. The fact that the new nation of the United States was separated from the rest of the world by an ocean on the east and an unexplored continent on the west served to prevent any attempt to spread the gospel of liberty by force of arms. But the general social law holds true that a creative social mind finds its expression at the point where a nation has developed its largest efficiency. The American colonies never developed a large military efficiency, but did possess at the time of the Revolution a very decided commercial and religious efficiency. Thus on this side of the Atlantic the

new liberty found expression largely in the field of commerce and the church and the closely allied field of education; and the new nation entered almost immediately upon that particular type of development which resulted in the United States of to-day. Its patriotism, therefore, while it made America always ready to recognize similar movements in European countries, never included the duty of the extension of liberty to other lands by force of arms. Patriotism, in the sense of loyalty to a national mission, was unmilitary and throughout the entire history of the United States has opposed military establishments and military preparedness commensurate with the growth of national power. In this sense it is undoubtedly historically correct to say that militarism and patriotism in the United States have been and are two mutually antagonistic conceptions.

In France on the other hand the necessity of defending the results of the Revolution which had brought about the destruction of the social order led to the development of military efficiency. The period during which the nation refounded itself was marked, not by the development of commerce and religious liberty, but by the necessary rise of military leaders. A sense of national mission involved the extension of constitutional rights to other na-

tions by force of conquest, and Napoleon was its natural fruitage. The early campaigns of the French under the leadership of Napoleon were avowedly for the purpose of extending liberty to other people. The fact that such a crusade resulted in an empire should not obscure the fact that the success of Napoleon did result in the extension of new legal and political conceptions upon the Continent of Europe. But the outcome was an increase of military preparations. The inevitable result of reliance upon military supremacy was soon apparent in Europe, and in the place of the peaceful and contagious spread of political liberty there followed the subjection of European states to a military empire. Patriotism, which at the start among the French was an unquestionable devotion to the vision of free peoples, was transformed into a short-lived loyalty to a military state. This state fell in a few years because its very success had induced a new group of national patriotisms, each one of which was given its content by the peculiar circumstances of peoples whom a common danger had aroused to a new sense of national significance and a new effort for national self-protection. This new patriotism overcame the mighty attempt to revert to military autocracy.

These two illustrations might suffice to bear out

the fact that with the period of revolutions we enter upon an era in which there emerged genuine patriotisms in the sense of loyalty to nations each with its own particular mission in life. Other illustrations might easily be found, but of them all it is necessary to mention only the outstanding instances of England. There the extension of the idea of the rights of Englishmen found its particular expression at the point of England's greatest historical significance, namely the development of constitutional government. Since the eighteenth century England has never undertaken to expand by the conquest of European or other politically self-sufficient states. It has established colonies and gained the control of states which, lacking efficient government, furnished commercial opportunities. As a result, during the last hundred and fifty years the English people have organized great democracies in Canada, Australia, and latterly in Africa. Its sense of national mission has been at once that of loyalty to self-government in its colonies and administrative betterment of peoples who were not possessed of the Anglo-Saxon traditions. But even among these latter peoples, as in the case of India, there has been a greater or less recognition of the rights of the people of the conquered territories to an increasing share in the ad-

ministration of their affairs. The patriotism of Englishmen, therefore, like that of Americans and Frenchmen, has recognized that their country has a rôle to play in history looking toward the extension of the rights of the individual. The loyalty of the Englishman to his country has been expressed, it is true, more than once in some form of imperialism, but this imperialism itself has carried in its heart something vastly more than superimposed sovereignty or the enforced subjection of non-English people to English social ideals. The development of democracy in England has been steady, and with it has gone the abolition of slavery, the emancipation of women, the extension of education and suffrage, and the socializing of governmental functions. And with this developing democracy has gone a deepening of the British sense of national mission to protect weak nations and deal fairly with rivals.

IV

It was in America that the new patriotism ceased to be ecclesiastical. Even in England the rise of religious independency was for generations handicapped by the identification of national and ecclesiastical interests. The Act of Conformity and the

entire policy of the Stuart family served, however, to intensify the struggle between national loyalty and ecclesiastical uniformity. In no other nation was there a similar struggle.

How rapid would have been the rise of national constitutionalism had religious independence advanced more readily in England, it is hard to say; but as it was, the English colonies freed patriotism from subjection to ecclesiastical control. True, with the exception of the thirteen American colonies, English patriotism has developed into that of a coöperative world-state. And it is not beyond the range of possibility that this sense of British solidarity, which to-day characterizes Canada and Australasia, might have continued in America if English toryism had not been given temporary power by the German junkerism of the House of Hanover. But as history developed, the English people in America first developed a patriotism which was genuinely national and religiously free, developing its own moral inhibitions and sanctions unrestrained by state-churches.

The nineteenth century saw this patriotism first worked out in the laboratory of Anglo-Saxon constitutional history on both sides of the Atlantic spread throughout the world. France after the Revolution increasingly embodied this idea of per-

sonal liberty in its national ideals, but until the last part of the nineteenth century no other great nation included within its patriotism similar ideals. Then for the first time in history there was to be seen the emergence of a democratic patriotism. Under Victor Emmanuel, Italy joined the founders of the new epoch, and in the last decade of the nineteenth and through the twentieth century nation after nation has developed in Europe a patriotism of like character. Japan adopted constitutional government and religious liberty; China under the pressure of the world-spirit cast off its monarchy and has begun the development of a patriotism that includes a national ideal as distinguished from the older pride in a past. Only in Germany, in Austria-Hungary, and in Turkey has the old type of patriotism, which consists in loyalty to a divinely established irresponsible monarchy, persisted without serious modifications.

It is not of liberty that the German patriot boasts, but of his *Kultur*, defended and enforced by arms. And when *Kultur* is described by its evangelists it is seen to be a patriotism centering about a state relying upon military power rather than regard for personal rights.

V

Thus in our day there appear two types of patriotism, that of democracy and that of autocracy. By their morals as by their history shall they be judged!

The patriotism of the democratic power has never been militaristic and has taken up the present conflict with loathing. The patriotism of the German is essentially militaristic and regards war as an integral part of a foreign policy. The patriotism of democracy has never demanded that its government should conquer lands possessed of settled national life. It has respected the rights of organized nations and has increasingly recognized the fact that loyalty to one's country involves the recognition of the rights of other nations. The patriotism of Germany has excluded all such recognition and has centered itself vigorously upon aggressive conquest and an immoral disregard of other nations' wellbeing. Justice, its leaders declare, is a civic virtue. "It is foolish," says Karl Peters (1915), "to talk of the rights of others; it is foolish to speak of a justice that should hinder us from doing to others what we ourselves do not wish to suffer from them." The demand of such a patriotism has been for the extension of national boundaries, the appropriation of

other nations' territory, the laying of crushing indemnities. The patriotism of democracy has sought to extend constitutional rights even to those less organized peoples over whom its power has extended; the patriotism of autocracy has subordinated personal rights to the power of a state, deriving its authority from no other source than inheritance given sanction by an appeal to a German God. When the democratic patriotism has turned to God, it is to the God who rules over other nations, who is the God of law and justice. When the patriotism of Germany has turned to God, it has been to a national god whose chief aim is to inspire the courage of those who draw the flashing sword and give comfort to those who have perished in the extension of national power and the brutal imposition upon other countries of its own national civilization.

Their conception of national obligation and mission has further given to the patriotism of free peoples the conviction that the relations of nations must ultimately be based upon mutual recognition of national rights and national individuality.

Such a development of international feeling was inevitable in democracies. A patriotism which recognizes the rights of one's fellow-citizens is slow to coerce the citizens of other nations. Desire for

conquest may almost be said to be inversely as the extent of a nation's democratization. The relations between Great Britain, France, and the United States is a striking illustration of this fact. For more than a hundred years these nations, despite the machinations of those who desired to see them engaged in a mutually fatal struggle, have been at peace. By this token can we see that democracies do not deliberately purpose to prey upon their neighbors. These nations have argued, quarreled, and occasionally threatened each other. But they have preferred arbitration to war.

How far the desire to establish some other basis than war for the settlement of international disputes has spread can be seen by a study of international arbitration. Up to the outbreak of the war in 1914 there had been established 208 bipartite treaties and constitutions between states. In addition to these there had been also one sextuple and one quintuple, the total number of such treaties being equivalent to 233 bipartite treaties. Of these four were superseded or had failed, leaving a net total of 229 arbitration treaties in force or expected to be in force. Of these Austria-Hungary had established 8, Germany had established 1, Bulgaria and Turkey had established none. On the other hand, of those

now allied against the Central Powers, Belgium had established 14, Brazil 33, China 2, Cuba 2, France 16, Great Britain 17, Greece 4, Italy 25, Japan 1, Portugal 18, Roumania 1, Russia 7, Siam 5, and the United States 28. Among the European neutrals, Denmark had established 13, Netherlands 7, Norway 13, Spain 31, mostly with the states of Central and South America, Sweden 13, and Switzerland 14. The remainder of these treaties had been established by the republics of Central and South America. Thus, of the significant nations concerned in the present war, the Central Powers had established 9 and the Entente Allies 173.

These figures are eloquent, for this new reliance upon arbitration was not forced upon unwilling patriots. It sprang from their own ideals. Democratic patriotism has included the recognition of the rights of other nationalities. A world under the control of this sort of patriotism would be a world at peace. Differences between nations, as in the case of the very important and irritating difficulties between the United States and Great Britain, would be settled by mutual compromise through arbitration.

That this consummation so devoutly to be hoped for has been furthered by the present war it is diffi-

cult to doubt. A League of Nations in the interest of the preservation of peace and democratic institutions is already in existence. It is fighting nations trained in a precisely opposite national policy. The difference is more than that of constitutional development, for constitutional development is the expression of an inner national spirit. The critical position in which the world finds itself to-day is the result of an education on the part of the German Empire in which patriotism and religion are made to perpetuate conceptions of national duty and policy which make wars of conquest whenever circumstances make them appear advantageous. Patriotism of this unethical sort has been born of Prussian hatred of popular rights. When Bismarck began the process of reorganizing Prussia, putting her at the head of a union of the German states, he could build upon a national spirit which had been developing from the days of the Great Elector. True, outraged by the policy of Napoleon and chastened by misfortune, this national spirit for a few years had hoped for liberalism. The great writers who flourished in Germany during the oppression of the Napoleonic military empire had undertaken to give an idealistic and broadly human quality to German, and particularly Prussian, life. They had met with

no little success. The spiritual renaissance of Prussia during the dark days which followed Jena was noteworthy above all else for its enthusiasm for the ideals of liberalism which had found expression in America, England, and France, but had been prostituted by Napoleon to his own ambitions. When the Napoleonic Empire fell, all Germany was alive with men who looked forward to the beginning of a new era. Constitutions, although not containing any very great amount of political liberty, had been given to Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Saxony. One had been promised in Prussia. The life of the country was full of a noble hope.

But it amounted to nothing. The Hohenzollerns would not give rights to their nation, and no German people dared to acquire popular rights by revolution. The years that preceded the rise of Bismarck are full of a persistent and successful attempt on the part of the Prussian government to destroy the liberal movement within its own boundaries. On several occasions Prussia was on the verge of revolution, but the Prussian people never went to the last extremity of conquering their rights. The leaders of the liberal movement were imprisoned, executed or fled the country. The rise of Bismarck resulted in the repression of constitutionalism and the institution of

a series of wars which brought territorial, political, and economic expansion to Prussia. The machinery of education was set in operation to produce a patriotism which would be ready to justify and follow blindly a policy of national aggression. The rise of social democracy was opposed bitterly, and the franchise was so limited or manipulated after the organization of the German Empire as to make powerless any school of political thought that would check the ambitions of Prussia by a recognition of the rights of other nations. Prussia planned to crush France, to get control of the Netherlands and the mineral deposits of Lorraine; to break at last the British commonwealth; to appropriate small nations whenever desired; and then, especially in the last twenty years, to put the United States "in their place." Parallel with this continental policy Prussianized Germany planned to establish a great colonial system and to appropriate the colonies of other peoples, especially those of Holland and Great Britain.

Such a frankly brutal policy, however, had to be justified by some idealistic appeal. Germans sanctified anti-internationalistic patriotism by appeal to their *Kultur*. Germans were instructed from infancy to believe in the absolute superiority of Ger-

man civilization. The mission of the great Empire, they were taught to believe, is to spread German organization over the world. There is to be no policy of *kultur* without a policy of power, declared the manifesto of the 352 university professors and other intellectual leaders of Germany in 1915. The justification of military expansion was set forth, not only from the necessity of commercial expansion and the building of a large economic state supported by the army, but by the need of enforcing the superiority of German methods, art, literature, organization, and education upon conquered nations by military authority. International law became a chimera. To offset the rapidly developing movement for disarmament and universal peace the German government spread the illusion of the danger to the Fatherland from other nations. Disregarding plain facts in the case — that England was without military preparation, that France was so affected by peace propaganda as to be reducing her standing army — the German people were taught to believe that their actual existence as a state was endangered. The Hague Conference was opposed or hindered, arbitration treaties were refused, patriotism and religion alike were made militaristic. Even during the last tragic days before the beginning

of the war, as we know now from English sources and the declaration of the German ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, England, so far from seeking to injure the influence and crush the expansion of Germany, had consented to Germany's having commercial dominance in Mesopotamia.

But all this was concealed, and the people were given to understand that the Fatherland was in danger. Some of the grounds upon which this absurd view was taken have been made to disappear, some of them by German authorities themselves. But the patriotism of the people had been so thoroughly shaped by the governing house that it was a force to which the Hohenzollerns could appeal. A great chorus of intellectual and junker protestations of loyalty to the German Empire broke forth in a pæan of *Deutschland über Alles*. The only fair way to describe this patriotism is to say that it is the old obsession for conquest which ruled in Assyria and in Rome, masquerading in an appeal to a highly organized and stimulated belief in the mission of Germany to force its civilization over an unwilling world. Even in the spread of *kultur* the German state, and not human welfare, was the center of patriotism.

The difference between the patriotism which thus

lies back of the German policy and that which lies back of the Anglo-French-American policy is grounded in a difference in the recognition of international justice. Democratic patriotism has never sought to spread by conquest the blessings which the various democratic nations possess. The United States and Great Britain have been the outstanding representatives of the spread of Christian civilization through foreign missions. Enormous sums of money have been raised for the purpose of establishing schools and churches among non-Christian peoples. Such Anglo-American civilization has never been enforced by military power. In India the British have been particularly sensitive to the prejudices of the natives, and in the Philippines, where the United States has established itself by military power, the people have been encouraged and permitted to take over an increasing control of political affairs.

It cannot, of course, be claimed that such extension of the best elements of our civilization has been conducted without mistakes. We must admit whatever facts go to show that methods have been used which are not consistent with the ideals for which we have stood. And it must be added that the Germans also, though to a far less extent, have

founded missions and schools among non-Christian people. But the great contrast lies in the general policy and tendency which the two types of patriotism have set forth — the one making central the German state and the other the furthering of human rights. The two types of patriotism are radically different and lead to radically different policies both at home and abroad. As to which will dominate the future no man of vision can doubt.

VI

We may then challenge any man who claims to be a patriot to answer this question: For what does your nation stand? Does it stand for the imposition of a national civilization upon nations whose inhabitants have been killed and starved and deported? Does it stand for the elevation of force into a religion and the organization of war as a legitimate and inevitable method of national expansion? Or does it stand for liberty and opportunity for the individual, the right of weak nations to maintain their independence and their national traditions, the submission of international disputes to arbitration, and the hatred of war as a curse?

When we as Americans face such questions as

these there need be no hesitation in our answer. It is time that we repudiated the slander which Germany has sedulously championed and propagated, that the United States is materialistic and dollar-mad. What nation in all the world has been more scrupulous in its regard of the rights of other nations? We have made mistakes. We have had our early period when we believed with other nations that it was right to conquer. But for seventy years we have dared follow ideals which are worthy of a Christian people. A war lasting four terrible years removed slavery from our constitutional life. We fought a war with Spain that Cuba might be free. And when we came into possession of the Philippines we not only paid an indemnity for our victory, but deliberately undertook to educate the Filipinos in the ways of democracy and self-government. We gave back an indemnity to Japan and refused to take a punitive indemnity from China. We have preserved the Western Hemisphere from European spoliation, and we have helped our neighboring weaker republics into financial health and international safety. We have refused to intervene in Mexico at the behest of concessionaires. We are at this moment fighting a war entailing unmeasured sacrifice, not only that we may be free from the

terror that intrigues by night and arms by day, but that the whole world may share in the same freedom.

The citizen of the United States need not be blind to the crudities, the blunders, and the shortcomings of his nation. Criticism is not tabooed by patriotism. We have done things we ought not to have done and we have left undone things we ought to have done; but by the grace of God there is health in us! We may wholeheartedly declare that we stand for a nation that has a mission; that dares to help other nations who are in distress and is determined to right wrongs it may have done. This is the patriotism of the future: a loyalty to a nation which by its own existence and purpose seeks, not only to make the world safe for democracy, but to make democracy safe for the world. The millions of fathers and mothers who see their sons swept into the maelstrom of war have no conflict with their consciences. These sons are not the creatures of the will to power, but of the will to serve. Our patriotism dares glory in its outlook and its hopes because it knows that the triumph of our land is the triumph of the cause of a better humanity. And because of this vicarious nationalism it dares pray with confidence to a god of Justice for victory in battle.

LECTURE III

RELIGION AND WAR

Patriotism is usually joined with war. It is naturally intense when a nation is fighting. Perhaps that is one reason why it had grown cold among us. For, long ago as it seems, it is only a few years since war for Amercia was a matter of hardly more than academic importance. We had peace societies, several of them heavily endowed, but their chief operation seemed to be with anachronistic issues. We told one another that war was economically impossible. We were unmilitary, and as a nation looked out upon war as something which might be expected in remote and backward regions like Africa, or in such turbulent and unmodern states as those of the Balkans. We had even come to believe the persistent assertion that the Kaiser was the guardian of the peace of Europe. Few Americans were interested in international affairs, and even our attitude in the Morocco imbroglio was that of benevolent aloofness. Our hopes were cen-

tered around the Hague Conference, and we had come to feel that the ever increasing intimacy and interdependence of nations, indeed that the course of civilization itself could be trusted to make wars cease. Peace was discussed in the genial atmosphere of banquets, and pacifism in its more intelligent moments seemed about to discover some moral equivalent for war.

It is easy now to see that we were not only over-complacent, but that we were being led astray by an active propaganda conducted by those who wished to keep us in a state of military unpreparedness in the interest of their own programs and policies. Most of us did not see this in 1914. The outbreak of the war found us as unprepared in spirit as in armament. In a sense this national attitude was to our credit. We were living like a gentleman with the world, and we refused to believe that any civilized nation was less a gentleman than ourselves. It was not strange therefore that the shock of conflict was as great in the field of our spiritual interests as on the fields of France. Its first horrors left us not only bewildered, but in distress of soul. Failing to understand the causes which had brought about the hostilities, many of us seriously protested that not only civilization but Christianity itself had collapsed.

So accustomed had we become to mistaking what ought to be for what really was, that we fell into all but mental and moral chaos.

Our first reaction was to reaffirm our faith in the supremacy of moral ideals. We could not believe the stories of atrocities which came to us with increasing volume. The crime against Belgium seemed to belong to the people of another world. Our attitude of mind was not exactly ostrich-like, but it was the attitude of those whose spiritual eyesight had been so accustomed to the mist of idealism as to be untrustworthy in the light of reality. Religious leaders reasserted with new emphasis the ideals of Jesus, and we believed that Christianity demanded if not actual non-resistance, at least a political neutrality and a detached moral attitude. As Americans we felt that the war was born of conditions of such thoroughly continental pedigree as to make it strictly European. Whatever may have been our personal sympathies, we demanded peace and determined to avoid every act and expression that threatened peace. Christianity we felt was opposed to war and the choice between war and Christianity seemed absolute.

I do not need to dwell upon the bitterness of the awakening. Our eyes were gradually cleared to see

the real meaning of the war. At last we were forced to realize that whatever may have been the occasions of the conflict, its fundamental causes involved us as truly as any other nation. But with the awakening came fundamental questions which continue to present themselves much to the disturbance of those souls which dislike to look at humanity as it is. For these fundamental questions focus in the challenge war makes to religion.

I

The conventional opinion of the relation of religion and war is that of antagonism. The awfulness of the one and the hopes of the other appear irreconcilable. It follows that the conventional opinion is apt to hold that the spread of religion will develop such hostility to war as to make universal peace a certainty.

Unfortunately the actual facts of human experience do not justify this opinion. Discrimination is imperative. Before religion ends war, religions which have hitherto been dominant must be materially changed. As a matter of fact, none of the great religions has been in practice frankly anti-militaristic. As a rule religion has been the support of the

warrior, and, with exceptions to which reference will be made later, has never intelligently devoted its moral power to making war impossible.

It needs no argument to show that ancient religions were militaristic. Yahweh of the Hebrews was the God of battles who taught his followers the use of the bow and the chariot, and who was expected to fight with his people's armies. There are no more terrible stories in history than those which describe the treatment accorded the Canaanites in his name. In this respect the Hebrew religion was at one with other religions. Polytheism always had its god of war or its goddess of savagery, and one of the chief duties of the representative of religion was to prepare his people for war.

This is, of course, only to say that religion has partaken of the general ethical quality of the societies its followers have formed. The history of humanity is a succession of bloody struggles. The moral content of religion has been largely drawn from contemporaneous social practice, and this has not been so organized as to raise the question of the justice of war as an expression of the fighting instinct of the race.

In addition, when one looks for the causes of wars he finds religion among the most potent. Moham-

medanism has notoriously been a military religion, but it would not be safe to say in this particular it has been any more pronouncedly militaristic than Christianity itself with its Crusades and Wars of Religion.

This fact, when once analyzed, is seen to mean that religions have failed to deal directly with the fundamental causes of wars. And it goes without saying that unless the forces which have led to wars shall in the future be dominated by moral vision and idealism sufficient to bring about international adjustments through arbitration and mutual compromise, war will remain inevitable.

To make this thesis more intelligible, let us ask the question: From what motives have wars sprung? When this is answered we shall be in a position to decide what deterrent to the appeal to arms our religion can render.

Referred to their basal causes wars have sprung from imperialistic and economic causes.

The wars of the ancient world were in most cases those of unashamed desire for conquest. That this desire had origins now beyond recognition may be true. Those who see only economic determinism in human affairs posit for all social action some economic force which in turn rests on geographical

foundations. And there is, of course, a large element of truth in such a contention. If we recall the turbulent course of history in the western world it is easy to see that the desire to trade with or to control the trade of other nations has led to war. Commercial expansion can be discovered in the struggles between the Greek cities inaugurated by Pericles. Doubtless if we were better informed as to the century long conflict which waged between the nations of the Nile and the Mesopotamian valleys, similar causes might be found at work there. But in the consciousness of these ancient states such economic motives were secondary to the primary desire of conquest. For conquest brought booty and slaves and tribute. To fight was the one way of expanding the income and the territory of the state. As one traces the rise of the ancient empires the conviction grows that the ambition for mastery led to the wars of conquest. Powerful nations like Egypt and Assyria wished to subdue the land which lay between them, and ultimately one another. The ruthless armies which swept down from the north and up from the south were primarily concerned in the building up of huge empires within which there should be subject cities and people. There is little evidence that either people sought to

control foreign markets, for commerce had not reached the development of modern times. The world was not industrial. The forces of production were very partially developed, and war sprang from primitive instincts rather than from economic policy. These ancient wars fill the pages of the Old Testament. The Hebrew invaders of Canaan were primarily conquerors who by force of arms took over a land flowing with milk and honey.

The same is true of the wars between Persia and Greece. Persia wanted to expand her power and rule the world. Greece refused to be submerged, and the Persian Wars which put an end to Persian ambitions and delivered Greece from fear of the Orient were due to no clearly discoverable commercial policy on the part of either of the two parties. Alexander, it is true, had Napoleonic plans for world-empire, but he died before he had transformed his newly acquired divinity into economic policy.

Similarly when Rome fought for supremacy in the Mediterranean basin. Its one great rival, Carthage, was a commercial city, but Rome had no commerce to be protected or extended. The issue was one of supremacy rather than of markets. The

Roman Empire was born of a Nietzschean will-to-power.

The wars of the early Middle Ages were largely fought for the purpose of extending feudal states. It was not until the social forces began the organization of modern nations that wars were fought primarily for commercial ends. And even then the economic motives outside of that of possession of more territory were often not paramount. Lords fought lords and kings fought kings to gain new territories and extend their power. The long wars between France and England increasingly involved economic conditions, but the dynastic claims were especially potent.

When, however, in the sixteenth century new continents were to be preëempted nations became increasingly economic. Possibilities of trade with India led inevitably to international struggles, while the enormous wealth of South American mines and the vast opportunities for colonization offered by North America became increasingly potent causes of the wars which all but wrecked Europe before and after that mad epoch known as the Thirty Years' War.

But it was not until the industrial age fairly opened in the eighteenth century and nations were forced

to find new markets for their rapidly increasing products that economic policy became militaristic. Imperialistic motives were present in the rapid development of Great Britain and in the career of Napoleon, but the new nations, though fighting like the ancient cities for territory and subjects, increasingly sought economic supremacy. Modern wars have been very largely economic. Some nation has possessed the raw materials which another nation wanted or determined to have in order to perfect its industrial development. Nations that would be commercial lacked harbors and struggled for access to the sea. The rapidly narrowing opportunity for colonization incited nations to fight other nations for the control of land as yet unappropriated by European states. Modern wars are born of a desire for immediate expansion of territory and for the control of world markets. The great nations who have harbors and colonies have been increasingly anxious for peace, while nations which like Russia and Germany lacked one or the other or both maintained war as a part of national policy. Commercial expansion was to be forced by arms. The German's demand for a place in the sun is traceable in no small degree to a belief that political supremacy is necessary for commer-

cial expansion. To Germany, as to Assyria and Ghengis Kahn, war is not a thing to be avoided, but to be expected, planned for, and declared whenever the moment seemed favorable. Germanic religion includes and justifies this fearful purpose. "A good Christian," declared the Kaiser in a public address, "is synonymous with a good soldier."

The ultimate relation of Christianity and war must be found in the attitude of Christians to these two causes of war, conquest and economic expansion through force. Appeals to Christian principles after national policies in these regards have been determined, in the future as in the past, will be futile. A nation's spirit, a people's loyalty, must come under the sway of Christian ideals if war is to end. Patriotism itself must embody and express the principles of Jesus if peace is to be on earth.

Let us at once grant that such a spiritual regeneration will not be instantaneous. It must be the result of social forces themselves. If Christianity is to end war it must cure the world of its lust for conquest and bring economic expansion under the control of justice. To this I shall return in my final lecture. For the present let us look at the situation the present war illustrates, considering only the broad question of Christian duty in a war

in which economic causes are not absent, but which has clearly become a struggle between two philosophies of the state, two national moralities. As events now stand, we must determine the call of duty with regard not to war in general but to a war in particular.

Two views regarding war as a phase of patriotism, each with its religious aspect, rule the world. The one is set forth in the past by world conquerors of Asia and Europe and to-day by the German publicists, philosophers, and statesmen. The other is set forth by France, Great Britain, and the United States. In measuring the moral values of these two attitudes of mind it is not enough to say that the one is the characteristic of a growing state and the other expresses the social mind of nations who have sufficient territory and commercial opportunity. Such an interpretation of a world-crisis is altogether too simple and materialistic. The deeper question arises, why, in the world at the beginning of the twentieth century, was it necessary for one nation to expand at the expense of another? Granting as we must that economic expansion in the past has been by wars justified and sanctified by religion, is there ground to argue that this must always be the case? In a modern world must commercial ex-

pansion be dependent upon military expansion, and must Christianity as a group attitude always leave the relations of nations to be settled by force?

The answer of German patriotism and religion is seen in the German view that aggressive war is a legitimate element in a program of national expansion. Leaders of German religious thought in published manifestoes have justified such an answer. Might, not the Golden Rule, must fix international relations. Such a view was not forced upon Germany. Its trade has expanded enormously without appeal to military coercion. Its fleets were upon every sea, its merchants were in every port. There was no let or hindrance offered by any state to this expansion. Its trade with its rivals was enormous, and was enriching all parties. The freedom of the seas was absolute. The passage of goods upon the land was unrestricted. If the history of the generation which made modern Europe shows anything, it shows that governmental assistance in the development of commerce was independent of military forces. The war that broke out in 1914 had, it is true, economic motives, but it was not born of simple economic necessity. The trade of Germany would have been assured if there had been no millions in arms. Deep beneath the present

world conflict lie two different social philosophies and two conceptions of morality. On the one hand is the state philosophy which demands political control through military power, and a religion that worships a German God of battles; on the other is the policy that seeks commercial development through the maintenance of peace and an attempt, imperfect though it is, to supply Christian ideals to international affairs.

Such a contrast events have shown involves not merely the policy of governments. It is also the expression of the mind of peoples. It embodies two conceptions of patriotism and religion. Germany, seeking commercial expansion through war, has trained its citizens — ninety per cent. of whom must always be subjects of a ruling tenth — both to accept its philosophy, and to identify national interests with militaristic policy and an imperialistic program. The Kaiser's heaven where, "assembled about the great Ally above" are Frederick II, William I and their generals and field marshals, is no place for democrats. Democracies have trained their citizenship to a belief that the economic welfare of a nation is to be reached through non-militaristic policies. If patriotism be loyalty to a nation's ideals, we have, as has already been pointed

out, not only two different qualities of patriotism, but also two different conceptions of the relation of religion to national policies.

II

The champions of the imperialistic and consequently the militaristic patriotism are not without argument. They appeal to the alleged law of biological necessity. They have the history of the past with its great empires of the East, of Alexander and of Rome. If social evolution has within it no idealistic creative power, if humanity is to be developed by the rigorous determinism of inherited conditions and animal evolution, it is indeed hard to see why war is not to be inevitable and permanent.

The champions of war can use still other arguments. War certainly brings group solidarity, both for the group itself and for its individuals. The mere aggregation of numbers under a common discipline and for a common end, has been of no small value. Practically all the modern nations have come into being through war. Humanity has always yielded to the enormous unifying power which lies in a socialized hatred. If you can get

men to hate together, they will act together. A nation's hatred reaches down to individuals and every citizen finds himself possessed of a desire to injure those who have been declared to be the nation's enemies. Patriotism becomes a socialized hatred that unites as it maddens an entire people to fight for national goals.

Furthermore, we need no Bernhardi to point out that war has inspired nations to common sacrifice and to bravery in defense of what is regarded as a supremely important common good.

One may even go further and say that it is not impossible that war has stimulated moral attitudes. Few modern nations have entered war without an appeal to noble sentiments and the protestation of loyalty to noble ideals. Out from such an attitude of mind have come noble examples of individual and social sacrifice and human hearts have been melted together by the fires of common agony. Our poetry is filled with war songs, and political leaders have very generally been soldiers.

But if thus war is not without its arguments, over against them must be others which modify the conclusions which have been drawn in favor of war. Not only does war plunge human life into the abysmal misery of fathers and mothers weeping

for their children, but out from the acute hatreds of war have come persistent hatreds which have perverted the relations of nations and incalculably hindered the development of the finer things of life. Individualism has been lost in military organization; injury to nations and to individuals has been not only economic but moral; unworthy ambitions have been given new life; and social reforms have been obscured or abandoned because of military necessity. If it be true, as must be admitted, that out from war has come renewed confidence in immortality and in God, it must also be admitted that just as truly from war has come a lowering of moral habits, the loss of momentum in social reconstruction, a brutalizing of the thought of God, and a carelessness in the recognition of human rights. It is no wonder that the heart of a genuine Christian cries out against such an evil.

How can those holding such divergent patriotisms profess the same religion? Do they not pray to the same God in the name of the same Christ? In answering such a supreme question it is necessary first of all to look at facts. And the answer here is the same in the case of Christian as in that of non-Christian people. Christianity, like the religions of Assyria, Egypt, Judea, Greece, Rome and Arabia,

has been the servant and defender of war. Of course, such an answer does not refer to Christianity as an ideal religious system. A truly Christian world would neither be armed nor in fear of armaments. But such a Christian world has never existed any more than has the Republic of Plato. In this sense is there truth in the cynical apothegm that Christianity has not failed because it never has been tried. The Christianity of our ideals is not the Christianity of history. Christianity as an historical religion is the religion of Christians; an actual social phenomenon; the mass of experiences, thoughts, behavior, institutions and teachings of a social group known as the church. It is not what it ought to be but what it has been and is. Church-Christianity has never been identical with the religion of Jesus. It has had the gospel about Jesus, but it has minimized the gospel of Jesus. It has progressed toward love of neighbors but it has not centered itself upon socializing that love as a divinely established duty for nations.

According to the authoritative formulas of Christian groups religious faith looks to a post-mortem salvation. It involves the acceptance of certain truths, which truths have been organized authoritatively by various groups and expressed in creeds,

confessions and rites. Every ecclesiastical orthodoxy has been developed in large measure outside the area of morality. The Apostles' Creed, for example, has within it no reference to morality. It sets forth certain things about God, about Christ, about the church, about the forgiveness of sins, about the second coming of Christ, and about the world to come. There is in it no reference to human relations, the need of love, the sinfulness of injuring one's neighbor. So far as the Apostles' Creed, the foundation of all orthodoxy, is concerned, the Sermon on the Mount is non-existent. The more elaborate creeds of the Catholic church, those of Nicea and Chalcedon, introduce morals no more than does the Apostles' Creed. The Athanasian Creed puts the matter sharply: to believe in the Trinity, in the two natures of the Christ is to be saved; to doubt them is to be lost. Even the doctrine of original sin as organized by Augustine and embodied in practically the whole mass of Christian theology, gets its moral element from the sin of Adam which has corrupted human nature so that every person is born not only sinful but damned. It is true that some are elected by God for His own good pleasure from this corrupt and hopeless humanity, but this election is explicitly said to be wholly

outside the region of human morality. Arminianism, it is true, recognizes that God's election is conditioned by His foreknowledge of man's faith, but this faith is still largely assent to metaphysical and eschatological propositions.

It is not difficult, therefore, to see why Christianity thus conceived has never included opposition to war. To it war is in an entirely different area from that of religion. Combatants can pray to God for victory, but their salvation from hell is not determined by any moral attitude of their own. Although a church may be a phase of national life, religion itself has not been primarily, if indeed, secondarily, concerned with the application of the principles of Jesus to the activities of social groups. Men have fought for their faith, but their faith has not kept them from fighting.

It is no accident, therefore, that ecclesiastically orthodox Christians have waged war consistently and almost continuously. There was nothing in their operating religion to prevent fighting. The state dealt with this world; religion with the next. When men like Francis of Assisi undertook to apply the moral principles of Jesus to life, their efforts involved the taking of individuals out from the social group. With St. Francis those who

sought to reproduce within themselves the life of Christ did so by withdrawing from the world, taking on the social attitude of beggary and the intermediate activity of charity. It is a state church-Christianity that supports German imperialism. And in Germany state-religion has never permitted any other conception of Christianity to be preached to the people. The liberalism of German university teaching has been academic and not socially reconstructive.

A second interpretation of Christianity is the precise opposite of this ecclesiastical orthodoxy of other-worldliness. The followers of Fox and Menno have emphasized mystical elements in religion, and in their morality have sought to produce an other-worldliness which, based upon certain teachings of Jesus, elevated non-resistance to a moral imperative. The effect of such a view of Christianity as this has been to produce a quality of soul that is among our noblest inheritances. In the effort of the Society of Friends to follow the guidance of the Spirit, we see sincere and beautiful expressions of the Christian spirit. They have endured the oppressions of their enemies in the spirit of forgiveness, and they have given to the world noble lessons in peace of soul and simple faith in

a God who is not far away, but present in the believer's heart. Such an attitude of mind has always been hostile to war. The Quaker has consistently followed his conscience and the inner light in refusing to participate in war, though he has not refused to be a good citizen and during war he has not hesitated to endure danger in the service of his fellows.

On March 29th, 1918, the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Friends issued this noteworthy statement:

"The basis of our opposition to war is much more than any single command of the Old or the New Testament. It is our faith that the way of love by which our Master, Jesus Christ, met and conquered evil, remains for His followers to-day the true method of combating wrong. For us, as for Him, this involves refusal to use means which, like war, violate love and defeat its ends; but it does not mean a weak neutrality toward evil. For us, as for Him, it means a life of action devoted to the heroic purpose of overcoming evil with good. The unspeakable sufferings of humanity are now calling us and all men to larger sacrifices and more earnest endeavors to put this faith into practice. To such endeavors we dedicate ourselves.

"In accordance with this faith, we desire to maintain all our relationships to-day.

"To our beloved country, we affirm the deep loyalty of grateful hearts. We long to help her to realize her noblest capacities as a great Republic dedicated to liberty and

democracy. But we believe that we best serve our country and all humanity when we maintain that religion and conscience are superior to the state.

"To President Wilson, we declare our appreciation of his steadfast and courageous efforts to keep the aims of the United States in this great conflict liberal, disinterested and righteous.

"To our fellow-countrymen, who are following the leadings of conscience into ways where we cannot be their comrades, we give assurance of respect and sympathy in all that they endure. Finally,

"For all men, whether they be called our enemies or not, we pray that the sacrificial love of Christ, stirring us to repentance, may reconcile and unite all mankind in the brotherhood of His spirit."

If the religion of the Quakers had become the religion of the world war would have ceased. But it has not become the religion of the world or even of an appreciable section of the world. Personally I believe its moral idealism is nearer the spirit of Jesus than is ecclesiastical orthodoxy, but the question that confronts us is not one of ideals or theories but of actual social attitudes and tendencies. Whatever may be our individual convictions, in the realm of actual conduct we are dealing with organized social groups controlled by socialized passions, convictions, and principles of conduct. Church-Christianity must be met by a more truly democratic religion if war is to end through the elimination of

social attitudes that lead to war. And this brings us to a consideration of pacifism in its larger aspects.

III

The pacifist is right when he claims that war is un-Christian, but he is mistaken when he claims that all participation in war is un-Christian. The truth of this paradox is apparent when opposition to war becomes opposition to *a* war. For an American to refuse to share in the present war, to oppose preparation for war, to induce men to avoid draft, and to attack all forms of military preparation for the purpose of national defense, is not Christian.

But how, one may ask, can this be true? Why should those who oppose war ever be under obligation to support *a* war? Pacifists, in the name of Christianity, vehemently affirm the inconsistency of such a thesis. Speaking generally their arguments are of two sorts.

There is first that of those pacifists who do not believe in human progress and who hold tenaciously and sometimes joyously to the belief that the world is growing worse. They reproduce the early Christian expectation of the speedy return of Jesus from

heaven and the imminent end of the world, and consistently urge that the true Christian awaits a great cataclysm due to the intervention of supernatural and miraculous persons. Why then fight?

Periods of war have repeatedly given rise to some form of this belief in supernatural intervention. At present the churches of America are dangerously full of this expectation. To an extent unbelievable by those who are out of touch with the situation, clergymen and others are going about the country announcing the approaching end of the world and calling upon people to await the millennium and the day of judgment. Prophetic conferences are being held in the larger cities, and throughout the country districts. The motives of these evangelists undoubtedly vary. Some are certainly sincere in their naïve centering of Christianity upon the second coming of Christ. Others are so hostile to the present policies of the government as to have been subject to investigation on the part of the Federal Government. But whatever may be the particular type of doctrine, the common element in all such beliefs is that history contains no hope and must come to an end. Fantastic expositions of scripture find in the Book of Revelation the number of the Kaiser, identify him with the anti-Christ, discover

prophecies of tanks in the prophets, dates when the war will end in Daniel and the Revelation, urge the church to await the miraculous disappearance of saints into heavenly "rapture," foretell a period of misery in which forces of evil are to be for a time triumphant, although in the end they are to be conquered by Christ and the angels.

Evidence at hand shows that the effect of such teaching is in many cases a refusal on the part of its followers to share in national burdens, either of military service or of financial support of the government or of the Red Cross. And even when such refusal is lacking, its champions, whether intentionally or not, sap the springs of national courage and make unintelligible prophesying superior to devotion to national well-being. With such pacifism intelligent citizens should have no sympathy.

The other type of pacifism is of a higher character. It looks to no miraculous end of the world, but rather to the operation of non-resistance not unlike that of the Society of Friends or the Mennonites. Its champions, however, as a rule do not belong to either society. Few of them are theologically orthodox; many of them are theological radicals. Like Tolstoy they are dominated by a conception of Christianity gained by neglecting the historical in-

heritances in our religion and by generalizing certain of the sayings of Jesus, like "resist not evil." The position which these pacifists take is in effect that the refusal on the part of a nation to defend itself against the aggression of another nation would tend to mitigate that other nation's aggressiveness and shame it into peace. They recall Christ's words about turning the other cheek, but overlook the social philosophy involved in his saying that those who take the sword shall perish by the sword. A distinguished representative of this point of view was recently asked as to how it would be harmonized with the treatment accorded by the Germans to Russia after the refusal of the Bolsheviki to engage further in war. Her answer was in effect that if the propaganda of the Bolsheviki had not been checked among the German soldiers, peace would have come.

Far be it from me to question the moral sincerity of these high-minded but unpractical souls. The conscientious objector — provided that he does not speak with a German accent — should not be persecuted. But sincerity is not synonymous with wisdom. Good people frequently lack good sense. The difficulty with these particular good people is two-fold: in the first place they overestimate the

power of moral ideals to determine the action of a nation which, like Germany, has organized itself for war and by an un-Christian philosophy has justified itself in its pursuance of war as a means of national development. And in the second place, they have an abstract view of morality. To them right exists apart from concrete human action. The actual forces of social evolution are neglected and moral imperatives are judged with no regard to the progress and impulses of men who are subject to the forces of social evolution.

And this amounts to another misinterpretation of Christianity. And only in a proper interpretation of Christianity is the solution of the paradox which we have just met.

Christianity as a religion is not to be described by making an anthology of the words of Jesus. It is not a generalization of the personal habits of Jesus. It is the actual reaction of individuals and groups to his ideals. Christianity is a social movement partly expressed and partly not expressed by the churches. Its center is not to be found in this or that word of Jesus or in anti-social individualism; it is rather to be found in the spiritual sympathies and tendencies of men and women who are indissolubly members of social groups. The moral

values which go to make up the ideals of these groups are never absolute but always relative. They are truly Christian in the proportion they tend to express the fundamental faith and principles of Jesus. The present issue is not between nations equally ready to be shown the way to give justice, but between nations one group of which is following Cæsar and the other of which is defending institutions embodying a developing appreciation of the ideals set forth by Jesus. It is for this reason that the conscientious objector is in danger of destroying the very idealism which, with the spirit of the early martyrs, he professes.

The fundamental principle of Jesus is love, not his own special application of this love to the particular duties of those preaching love. The sayings of Jesus dealing with non-resistance were never brought by him into the political field. They were intended by him to direct the action of his followers in putting the principle of love into operation. When his disciples went forth to preach the triumph of human brotherhood they would be setting forth ideals which interfered with certain privileges and customs and institutions of the world in which they lived. They would undoubtedly meet with persecution. They were not to undertake to convert men

to love by appeal to force, nor were they to seek to revenge themselves upon their persecutors. All this is beyond question the true attitude of the Christian. You cannot make men brotherly by terrorization, neither can you spread the principle of love by hatred and vengeance.

Even in the larger field of national life this is true. The enforced Christianization of heathen tribes like that of the Saxons by Charlemagne and the Prussians by the Teutonic Knights has not served to develop the moral impulses that have sprung from the work of modern foreign missions. A complete appraisal of German Christianity cannot overlook the effect of the brutality that attended the conversion of the tribes that have united in the German people.

Back of its specific application is the principle of love itself. Love is a way of treating other people. Jesus grounds its finality in its likeness to the moral nature of God. It is not a formula but social action. In the case of individuals it involves much more than good nature or submission to injustice. We recognize this in civil affairs where laws are a more or less successful attempt to organize social action in accord with the principle formulated by Kant: "Act so as to use humanity, whether in

your own person or in the person of another, always as an end, never as a means." Obviously the moral problems set a community which endeavors to put the principle of brotherhood into operation are vastly more complicated than the pacifist chooses to see. The development of civilization proceeds gradually, by the embodiment of ideals in human institutions. These institutions which guarantee personal liberty, the right of initiative, democracy in the sense of a people's right to control its own affairs, exist as an exceedingly precious heritage for succeeding generations. They increasingly embody the giving of justice, the social synonym of the love Jesus taught and embodied. They must be preserved if morality is to be preserved. To submit passively to their destruction is a violation of the fundamental principle of brotherhood. Society recognizes this clearly enough in its attempt to protect itself from evil minded men like thieves, adulterers, and oppressors of their kind. The decision as to whether a citizen shall undertake such protection is not a matter of individual likes and dislikes but of social obligation. The fact that as human society grows more responsive to ideals of justice and fraternity, the protection of the finer institutions of human welfare becomes increasingly conventional and so less

in need of reliance upon force, serves only to obscure the fundamental necessity of a society's being able to offer protection to its members and successors if institutions born of justice are endangered. A refusal to undertake the duty of guaranteeing such protection, whatever may be its alleged ethical justification, is in reality an anti-fraternal act. While we must oppose every illegitimate appeal to force, all unintelligent treatment of criminals, the hideousness of mob violence and the excesses of punitive justice, the basic fact still remains: for the benefit of society love must protect institutions which embody and preserve its own progress. When a nation which despises love as effeminacy and honors the "will to power" attacks those institutions, there is only one duty before nations who love peace. They must exhaust all efforts to settle international difficulties by arbitration and moral appeal; but if these fail they must protect justice and liberty by force. To do otherwise would be disloyalty to those men and women of the future for whom we are trustees of a heritage of justice and liberty.

If we would apply the teaching of Jesus to national action we must hold fast to the principle of good neighborliness.

It is not always safe to build hypotheses around a parable, but at least it is as legitimate as are some interpretations to which the parables have been subjected. Let us suppose the Good Samaritan had arrived while the robbers were attacking their victim. What should he have done to merit the approval of Jesus?

In the first place, he might have done nothing. His interest might have been highly scientific. He might have watched the technique of the robbers, the way in which they stripped their victim, the way in which they disappeared. If he had been thoroughly modern he might then have made a study of their thumb marks so as to be able to identify the perpetrators of similar robberies in the future. Then after he had taken the necessary notes he might have cared for the wounded traveler.

Can any one hold that this would be an application of the principle of neighborliness?

Or, the Good Samaritan, when he came upon the traveler struggling with the robbers, might have said to himself, "Here is a providential opportunity to recoup myself from losses in business." And so he might have taken the traveler's baggage and the robbers' baggage and gone on his way to Jericho.

Would Jesus have told the lawyer to go and do likewise?

Or, he might have said, "This is a moment to call a conference which shall vote measures that shall police the road from Jerusalem to Jericho so that there shall be no robbers." Would such action, necessary as it might be at other times, have been a practical expression of neighborliness?

Or, the Good Samaritan might have said, "This is certainly a sad occasion, but my obligation as a Good Samaritan is one of amelioration. I will therefore find a shady place where I may wait until the robbers finish their work, and then I shall be ready to care for the wounded man and perform the other duties which are expected of Good Samaritans."

Can any sane man think that Jesus would have advised such conduct? Would not the very principle of love and desire to help a man in danger, the very spirit of Calvary itself, have led this man to help the unfortunate traveler defend himself?

Let us get this principle of sacrificial social-mindedness clear. Once grasped, the method in which it is expressed is a matter of intelligence.

Love is not to be limited to Red Cross service.

Such sacrificial social-mindedness as the Good Samaritan might have exhibited is not militarism. Just how far we should interfere in other people's quarrels, how far we should use our resources to protect the defenseless, how far we should undertake to erect proper social defenses which would make Good Samaritans unnecessary, must be left to the wisdom which our trained experts may show us.

But no man is a Christian who believes that anything injurious is right. No man has the spirit of Christ who is content to permit wrong to seek its victims. Personal comfort, life itself, is as nothing compared with the giving of justice, for which Jesus himself died.

So in the case of a nation that sees the world and itself attacked by another nation bent upon terrorizing its neighbors into subjection and destroying the most precious institutions of civilization. Pacifism under such circumstances is anti-social, a misguided idealism if not transcendentalized selfishness. The duty which a nation owes to a world as well as to itself and its future compels it to protect its institutions and its very existence against the assault of a national highwayman. And this duty must infiltrate the moral action of indi-

viduals. Christians are not insulated individuals; they are citizens.

This is the real spirit with which Christians must approach the question of a war. Against our likes, our hopes, our ideals, we fight because we love our race. War born of a perverted patriotism, war for the sake of national aggrandizement at the expense of other nations is un-Christian, no matter how much it may masquerade under appeals to the God of Gideon and of David. But the very essence of a Christian patriotism appears in the defense not of national institutions as such, but of institutions which are increasingly if not completely Christian. Love, which is the heart of the Christian message, cannot permit a nation to remain neutral while the well-being of other nations is endangered. The highest sacrifice which love demands is a frank recognition of the necessity of abandoning the ideals of peace when peace involves the suffering of others. The true Christian patriot at the present moment is in fact saying to certain ideals, "You must for the moment retire from the scene. I have a desperately nasty mess to clean up. I am not responsible for the situation, but you are powerless to help. It is a choice between defending institutions which

guarantee your existence and permitting these institutions to go down to destruction." And my own conviction is clear that such self-sacrifice in the interest of making permanent the achievement of peace and justice is the most idealistic service a man or a nation can render the world. Refusal at any personal cost to partake in a war of oppression, of conquest, of international looting, is truly Christian. Conscientious objectors in nations bent upon waging such a war, are worthy of a martyr's crown. But not to share in a war of defense of justice is to distort both patriotism and religion. A nation suffering and struggling vicariously is furthering Christian morality. It faces new moral crises, it is true. It must not be permitted to descend into habitual militarism. But it demands our support. In furthering its success we rightly know again the patriotism that is more than aggressive nationalism. In full justice, may we cry to a nation we see is more than wealth or territory,

"What were our lives without thee?

What all our lives to save thee?

We reck not what we give thee,

We will not dare to doubt thee,

But ask whatever else, and we will dare!"

IV

Ideals work when they draw men toward themselves. But such approach is registered not in abstract theories, but in social accomplishment. To protect such accomplishment in the interest of the still more complete embodiment of ideals is loyalty not only to a nation, but to our religion. In such a situation, true patriots find in religion no loyalty like that felt to a monarch who seeks to exploit God and humanity in order to justify his own ambition at the expense of others. Loathing war, determined to end war by the regeneration of the forces that shape national action, such patriots dedicate themselves to a national service which gets its value not from uncritical loyalty to a nation but from loyalty to a nation which has consecrated itself to the good of humanity. It is this sort of patriotism that we dare call Christian. "We hope," a well-intending body of Christians once said to Mr. Lincoln, "that God is on our side." "I am not much concerned," said Mr. Lincoln "to know whether God is on our side. What I want to know is whether we are on God's side." With this desire American patriotism may now face its terrible task. We pray for the victory of our arms, not because we demand

that God shall give victory to our country whether we are right or wrong, but because we are convinced that the cause for which we struggle is more precious than a peace bought at the expense of the world's warfare; that the cause for which we fight is God's cause as we know it revealed both in the life and the ideals of Jesus and in the unmistakable tendencies of social evolution.

A religion which will keep its followers from committing themselves to the support of such patriotism is either too æsthetic for humanity's actual needs, too individualistic to be social, or too disloyal to be tolerated.

LECTURE IV

THE SERVICE OF RELIGION TO PATRIOTISM

If patriotism can be justified because of the service one's nation can render the world, no argument is needed to show that it must rest on a national morality. In the interest of such morality religion must serve patriotism in the future more wisely than in the past. True, Christianity has insisted that those who are saved ought not to steal or murder or commit adultery; but as has already appeared, the ecclesiastical doctrines of salvation have shared in a general misapprehension of the moral control that lies in group-life. Salvation as the supreme end of religion has been presented as a rescue from a world that is corrupt and hopeless. The bright hopes of a blissful eternity have been presented against a background of social pessimism. Until our own day there has been no serious attempt to apply the principles of Jesus as distinguished from Hebrew legislation to economic life, or to conceive of nations as under moral restraints in their deal-

ings with each other. War has all but never been condemned. The conquest of weak nations has been regarded as an evidence of divine favor, and the God of battles has been the only God that kings have known. Christians have always fought. The extension of the principles of Jesus into group morality is so modern as even yet to be vehemently assailed as an abandonment of the "simple gospel." As the inspirer of international morality, a church-Christianity has been all but negligible. The leaven was prepared but men have seldom had the good sense to hide it in the meal. Only in those nations in which there has been a recognition of the rights of the people and the organization of governments responsible to the people,—each an expression of fundamental Christian idealism—has there been any development of a social morality capable of international application.

This is not to say that Christianity has had no social influence. It has had decided social influence. The churches have been laboratories in which individualistic morality has been developed and where democracy has been to some extent learned. How significant have been these lessons in Anglo-American politics has already been pointed out. It is no small achievement to have restrained economic

pressure by the observance of the Sabbath, given moral sanction to marriage, and elevated the position of women. But the influence of Christianity as a church religion has by no means been the sole cause of social reforms. Other forces have co-operated and at times have been obliged to overcome the influence of a church championing vested economic and political privileges. The rise of public morality is altogether too complicated a process to be credited to any single cause. Judged from its literature, its formulas and its teaching, the church even in our own day has not frankly faced the problems of group morality. It is only within recent years that the inter-relation even of churches themselves has been placed on an approximately moral basis. For centuries whenever a Christian group has obtained control of a state, persecution has followed. Lutheran Prussia repressed the Crypto-Calvinists with imprisonment and death; Calvinists of Holland persecuted the Arminians; the church of England has executed Catholics, Baptists and Unitarians. Until the rise of the American nation, religious liberty was unknown and the church and the state were not separated. It is no wonder, therefore, that if Christian groups could not live together without violence, nations should have lived

with even greater disregard of moral ideals, and that international law should have been a matter in which Christian teachers were only incidentally concerned. If the salt lacked savor, how could it be salted?

But we already see the rise of a simpler Christianity and a truer perception of the scope of Christian moral ideals. Our own generation has been a pioneer in this extension of moral imperatives to groups. The conception of Christianity as something richer and more vital than theological precision has been both the outcome and the cause of an incipient social morality. So far from being discouraged in the present crisis, we should be full of hope. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first war that has avowedly been fought for the purpose of ending war. Therein lies hope.

The history of the international relations of democracies is a tribute to the change that is coming into our conception of Christianity. We have unfortunately to admit that this truer conception of the Christian faith is by no means universal. Too many of our churches are still in the control of professional churchmen whose vision is sectarian and who think that the gospel has no place in social affairs beyond the maintenance of individual respecta-

bility. Just at present forces of reaction are especially in evidence working mightily to keep Christianity within the confines set by the past, preferring an infallible Pope or an inerrant Bible to the spirit of Jesus and the ideals of the Kingdom of God. But never before were there so many evidences of the rise of a true Christianity. Denominations are ceasing their internecine strife and are organizing Federations and World Conferences. The bankruptcy of theological orthodoxy as an agency to prevent war forces thoughtful men to reconsider the real place of Christianity in our social order. We are repatriating Jesus in Christianity. Out of the Calvary of the present war will come the resurrection of a faith above shibboleths, born of a tested confidence in God, in Jesus, and human progress.

When we ask how this should and will affect patriotism as the expression of a national loyalty, we are passing from history to prophecy. Yet even here we are not at the mercy of hope unregulated by facts. Historical tendencies become our guide. Genuine religious faith does not attempt to rehabilitate the past, but to reconstruct the future. Superficial optimism has no place in such forecasts, for the God we must worship is not the God of a finished world, but a God who coöperates with man-

kind in the production of a new world. From faith in such a God springs new confidence in the possible influence of a genuinely Christian spirit in national affairs. The new world has not been born, but there is still opportunity for the exercise of prenatal influences.

I

A religion fit for democracy will ennoble patriotism by giving moral direction to the spiritual life of a nation.

As the Archbishop of York has admirably pointed out, the war is teaching us the power of ideas. Unfortunately in too much education ideas have been at a discount. For a generation and more our schools and colleges have been increasingly emphasizing scientific attitudes and methods. Little by little we have seen the old humanistic education give way to the study of the physical forces of nature. Languages have gradually been forced to retreat from their earlier primacy, and in their place has come a study of phenomena that can be understood without recourse to personality. It would perhaps be too much to say that our education has become materialistic, but it has certainly grown less idealistic.

Technical educational discussions are largely concerned with pedagogical mechanics. The test of a successful grade teacher has been frankly said to be her ability to prepare pupils to move into the next grade. Muscular efforts in handwriting, the height of school-room desks, the length of school-periods, have been given elaborate attention. Education for making a living has increasingly been emphasized. Educational foundations have been devoting themselves to furthering the science of medicine, chemistry, and biological research. Mechanistic interpretations of life have been developed until psychology has become a matter largely of nerves and muscles, life a physical response to physical forces, and history a by-product of climates and of geography. Even socialism, the one outstanding movement which claims to emphasize social forces, has all but delivered itself over to economic materialism.

Such a description of educational methods is, of course, subject to many exceptions and considerable modification. No one can deny the importance of the various subjects involved. But such facts raise the question whether we have been moving in altogether the true direction. Are not ideals also of educational importance? The war has made us

realize that a difference in educational systems is largely responsible for the difference in the patriotisms of Germany and the democratic states. Ideas which make war desirable have been built into the German soul. The materialistic tendencies of German education have been accompanied by a highly systematized manipulation of German intelligence by the state. To German school children, patriotism has become a form of national religion, and religion a phase of education in patriotism. The German *Kultur* is not civilization in the noble sense given that word by French writers, but a training in the worship of national institutions, language and literature, made efficient in social organization by technical accomplishments in physical science. Liberty and equality are not elements in *Kultur* and form no part of German education.

A nation filled with megalomania has so organized its education as to insure a national spirit that approves the subjection of the masses to the privileged classes. Ninety per cent. of German youth are debarred by the educational system from any other sort of training. They are trained to obey the other ten per cent. In such a social order religion has carried forward the national ideal. It has been made a part of national education, giving

sanctity to a patriotism that knows no morality beyond national boundaries, and conferring no ability to reform a government that does not derive its authority from the consent of the governed. Such a patriotism has never been taught the ideals of Jesus, and in war is subject to small moral restraints. It exploits the technical abilities of a nation to further national pride and the exploiting of subject peoples. The religion it demands is national religion. "When we talk frankly and boldly about the German God," says Baron Hans von Woltzen in the *Berlin Post*, "what we mean to express thereby is the power of the divine action within the German soul, for only in the German soul is centered the kingdom of God."

A religion that thus yields itself to the will of the state is certainly far enough from the Christianity of Jesus. The type of Christianity it demands and fosters is that which writes a pious preface to the articles of a Holy Alliance and in the words of no less a theologian than Wilhelm Hermann likens its faith to that of Mohammedanism. It is no wonder that so far as we know it is silent as to the horrors of Belgium, Serbia, Poland, and Armenia, except when it issues statements justifying their perpetration. Such a religion together

with the patriotism it would sanctify, leaves Germany no hope for a Christian patriotism until German Christians, rejecting Cæsar, become the disciples of Jesus.

If German educational methods enforcing such ideas of religion and patriotism were limited to the German people itself, their menace would be sufficiently great. But they have not been so limited. German patriotism has been as aggressive in the world of ideas as in its search for annexations and indemnities. As in their battles Germans have begun their assaults by poisonous gas attacks, so during the past ten or fifteen years has our educational system been subject to a German attack upon the ideals of democracy. Few teachers in our universities have escaped the miasma of German *Kultur*. Our sociology, our history, our political economy, our psychology, have all been learned in Germany or markedly affected by the pre-supposition of the German teaching. We have listened to attacks upon the inefficiency of our institutions, the crudity of our science, the amateurism of our history. Germany has systematically undertaken to undermine the American patriotism of American citizens of German descent. The propaganda of anti-American ideas has magnified Teutonism, belittled American-

ism, forced the German language upon public schools, organized societies to strengthen the allegiance of American citizens to a German Fatherland.

But at this point a caution is to be uttered. In view of this attempt to educate a nation in self-depreciation it is not surprising that we are being warned against scholarship that is in any way allied with Germany. But we need to preserve our common sense while we accomplish the destruction of anti-American forces. In an assault upon German propaganda every good citizen should join. But scientific methods in education and religious scholarship are not false because Germans have used them. We do not abandon military science because Germans exploit its results. Science is not nationalistic. In all departments it has been as much the creation of Englishmen and Frenchmen as of Germans. Scientific method is the joint product of the intellectual life of the entire world. To abandon it because of German political propaganda would be insanity.

Equally true is it insanity to abandon theological science because of German misuse of the Bible. Champions of reaction and obscurantism declare that the war is the outcome of German higher criti-

cism. Germans, they say, first undertook to break down faith in the Bible in order that they might break down the peace of the world. The only hope that is left to the church of Christ is a return to the theories of verbal inspiration, and a belief in the end of the world at the speedy coming of Christ!

Nothing could be more truly theological demagogism. The theology of the Kaiser is not the theology of the modern theological world. It is the theology of orthodoxy and of confessionism. The God he sets forth is not the God of Jesus. He is not the God of the prophets. He is the God of the persecutor. He is the God to whom Luther appealed when he justified the slaughter of the peasants; the God summoned to justify the imprisonment of Grotius, the persecution of Crypto-Calvinists, the execution of John of Barneveldt. As such he is peculiarly the property of the state. Professor Ostwald never said a truer word than when he declared "in our country God the Father is reserved for the personal use of the Emperor."

The theology which is preached by all reactionaries is the theology which has justified war. It is born of a misuse of the Scripture, an unwillingness to face the moral demands of Jesus, and a denial

of the supremacy in history of a God of love and justice.

Historical criticism has not given rise to German worship of force. It has opened the way to a true understanding of how to do justice, to love mercy, and to walk humbly before a God who is the God of Amos and Hosea, of Isaiah and Jesus.

The effort to identify the historical study of the Bible with German *Kultur* not only displays ignorance as to both *Kultur* and theological science, but it tends to elevate a theory of inspiration above a faith in the God of law and love, and limits the moral power of Jesus to the rescue of individuals from vulgar sins.

Such religious teaching as is now organizing prophetic conferences and damning an honest and intelligent use of the Scripture is ruining the church and hindering the spread of a genuinely Christian civilization.

Such propaganda so misuses the Bible as to make it a menace to genuinely religious faith. To identify it with piety is to make piety pre-Christian. To demand that the doctrines which it draws from its perversions of inspiration shall become the dominant rule of the church is to make it certain that the church will become composed of groups of men

and women who are a hindrance to the spread of the gospel of Jesus. Literalism threatens the very heart, not only of the Christian religion, but of civilization. A theology under which the present war was possible holds out no promise of lasting peace.

Only he who approaches the Scripture in sympathy with the historical method is capable of intelligently applying its revelation of God to a travailing world. Any one who knows the actual bearing of historical criticism upon our religion, needs no arguments to prove that the properly scientific historical approach to the study of religion is the great hope of the spiritual life of the future. Theological science is far enough from being German propaganda.

The real significance of the Germanizing of the world's thought lies not in its use — or misuse — of scientific methods. It lies rather in a debilitating skepticism regarding our national ideals and the applicability of the principles of Christianity to social affairs. True Christianity is as compatible with scientific method as it is incompatible with political autocracy. The German mind has one supreme test for all applications of the principles of Jesus to the social order: does such an attempt tend towards democracy with its recognition of the necessity of

equal opportunity for the individual; or does it tend towards an elevation of the state as the end of individual life? Only that which conforms to the second alternative is to be accepted. German religion could not be other than anti-social, for the development of the highest social ideals will abolish privilege and superimposed authority. The God of Jesus would repudiate responsibility for the authority of the Kaiser. But such anti-Christianity is not born of scientific method but of the national spirit that refuses to apply scientifically the results gained by the method to the needs of men and women. The contrast which we have repeatedly discovered between German and democratic patriotism must control discussion of the relations of religion to national ideals. Is Christianity to perpetuate autocracy, or is the gospel of Jesus to be a leaven for the transformation of society in the interest of democracy? The world-situation shows that the only hope of a Christianized patriotism is to be found in those countries where the people themselves are free to embody the ideals of Jesus in social institutions; where reform springs from a socialized regard for justice rather than from feudal benevolence; where the church like the people is free to express its conviction of the need of social change; and where political life is free to express

popular ideals in social transformation. None of these possibilities are permitted German churches by the German state.

As representatives of the democratic patriotism, Americans are in particular need of a Christianized public opinion. As already has been said, our democracy has been born of our religious liberty, and our active Christian conscience has played no small rôle in the maintenance of peace between ourselves and other nations. But we need to go further if our national life is to meet the crisis in world relations which will follow the war. National policy will embody our best ideals only as those ideals spring from our inner social life. International justice must be grounded in domestic justice. Social service in the sense of caring for the unfortunate through institutions of charity is possible in an autocracy, but social transformation through establishing a genuine fraternity is politically possible only where there is democracy. To recognize this possibility is to demand the spread of justice. If our nation is to be a plutocracy, it will be no more democratic than an autocracy. If the rights of our working men are to be gained only through more or less developed revolution which forces privileges from those who are unwilling to surrender them, our Christian

morality is certainly weak. The center of Christianity is a sacrificial social mindedness. God and Christ sacrifice for men; men must sacrifice for each other. The gospel appeals to those who have enjoyed privileges denied their less fortunate fellows. The war in bringing us a clearer insight of our fundamental national unity is helping us to see that justice is the obverse of fraternity. Moral advance is increasingly seen to involve such concrete matters as the housing of the working man, the shortening of his working day, the increase of his opportunity for leisure and his larger share in the product of his own labor.

The last twenty-five years have shown that Christianity has a social power far beyond that of a mere incentive to social amelioration. Amelioration it is true is an approach to justice, but the creative religious teaching of the last quarter century has been reshaping patriotism itself into a devotion to human rights championed by national action. Sometimes this reconstruction has expended itself in denunciation of evils and unlimited criticism of our life and institutions. More than this, however, it has shown itself in an education in moral sympathies which has hastened the recognition by the capitalist class of its obligations to the people. It is true this proc-

ess has still far to go before it reaches its goal. We still need to learn how to share privilege intelligently. The worth of the individual still needs to be more honored than class privilege and economic efficiency. Human motives, especially in the economic world, need inspiration for sacrifice in the interest of justice. During the last few months we have rapidly learned this lesson. We see clearly that our national ideals are worth fighting for. We are beginning to see that the virtues which we demand of a nation in its world affairs must rule a nation's inner life. If we are to make the world safe for democracy, we must make our own nation more than politically democratic. The ideals for which men die in war are ideals for which they must live in peace.

Here the Christian religion, freed from its entangling alliances with metaphysics and ecclesiasticism, can be the great source of spiritual inspiration. It fires our hearts with more than a reasoned conviction that democracy is God's will; it gives us visions of what a nation should really be. Because we are Christians we feel in our national life the uplift of the divine presence; the courage which comes from a belief in the inevitability of God's good will and the supreme value of human souls.

For those who have such spiritual reserves upon which to call in moments of national strain and stress, patriotism ceases to be primarily a militaristic virtue. A patriot must needs often become a soldier in order that government of the people, for the people, and by the people shall not perish from the earth. But he needs also to be loyal to national ideals which will lead him to face the duties set by peace. Justice and liberty are supremely valuable even when we do not go to war to protect them. When the war drums sound no longer there will still be demand for those who are ready to sacrifice their individual comfort and privilege, it may be life itself, for national ideals. Democracy as a phase of actual concrete living cannot be indifferent to the inner dangers that beset it from anti-democratic capitalism or an anti-moral materialism. War itself must be outgrown through the moral adjustment of issues from which wars have sprung. Citizens must believe in a God who works through the development of institutions that give equality of opportunity to every member of a national group and to nations themselves. The issues of our economic life must be seen to be as exigent as battles and the protection of human welfare as imperative

in the relation of economic classes as in the bloody struggle of nations.

Any religion that shirks such duties as peace proposes can never be the religion of the world. A pessimism that blinds men's minds to the possibility of ennobling social evolution and which refuses the sacrificial devotion of one's life to the cause of human progress in days of peace is unworthy the name of Christianity. The same devotion that carries nations into the valley of the shadow of death must not grow cold as they rest beside the still waters. For such devotion patriotism needs the inspiration that fundamental religion can give. The course of world events has reduced all national issues to a choice between Cæsar and Jesus. Hitherto Cæsar and the church have made common cause. Formulas of other-worldly salvation have shown themselves incapable of elevating patriotism from the virtue of the warrior into devotion to a better social order. In the religion of Jesus rather than in the religion of the ecclesiastic lies all hope that patriotism shall be transformed from a belligerent into a coöperative virtue.

II

Religion is needed to strengthen the heart of the patriot in days of national trial.

Strength of heart and capacity to endure national defeat have always been given patriots by their religious faith. The records of the past are full of men and women who confiding in a nation's God, like the Roman Senator have never despaired of their nation's future. A Jeremiah buying land in a moment of national eclipse; a William of Orange facing the might of an arrogant conqueror; a Washington praying in the snow at Valley Forge; are but examples of millions of the men and women less known but equally trustful amid national sorrow. The Psalms of an exiled Hebrew; the eschatology, so easily misunderstood by us moderns, of a Jew crushed by Syria and Rome; the stirring words of Schiller to a nation which had not yet given itself over to international brutality, express hopes that have thrilled innumerable nations in their defeat. Strip from patriotism its belief that God will ultimately give success to the righteous cause for which their nations fight, and you have left only the lamentations of the conquered.

Such religious faith has generally clothed itself

in the conceptions of supernaturalism but it is equally the possession of those who recognize the unity of the divine will and natural law. Whoever believes intelligently in God, believes also in a divine will present in human affairs. Human history forecasts the course of human progress. Tendencies are more eloquent than scattered events, for tendencies show that God is still perfecting an unfinished creation. But the eye of faith that thus seeks to read the meaning of the past must be single. National pride too often obscures the true meaning of history. A German may believe that the world-spirit finds his fullest expression in the *Kultur* of Prussia, but he who believes in the God of the universe rebels against such provincial conceit. He dares hope for a future that shall not be subject to a conquering nationalism. Out from the storm and stress of the passing moment one looks back over the steady progress of personal values, of human rights, of sacrificial justice, and sees therein the working of a God who is no national deity but the God of a developing humanity. True prophecy does not lose itself like astrology in the ingenious manipulation of facts, but sees the divine will operating in current events. In such vision lies intelligent hope and a faith not to be staggered by the defeat of

righteous causes. Men of this spirit know that Calvaries must be endured if resurrections are to be enjoyed, but they never doubt the dawn of a national Easter. Time is always on the side of the inevitable. To doubt the ultimate, even though it be but slowly progressing, triumph of justice, is to deny the evidence of history itself.

Moments of anxiety test the moral fiber of individuals and nations. The patriotism that leads men to join forlorn hopes is heroic; but religion does more than nerve Childe Rolands to attack the giants of dark towers. It gives to nations struggling for the rights of humanity courage in moments of despondency, self-control in the agony of evil tidings, hope in the time of defeat. We, like the Hebrew prophet, can recall the doings of God in our past. True, such religion may be without its conscious theology, spontaneous rather than institutional, instinctive rather than meditative. But it is religion none the less. And it is this religion we can bring to our own hearts in these days. When one takes a long view of the past and sees how humanity in its best moments has organized for itself institutions that insure the rights of the weak, and enforce the duties of the strong; when one sees a whole world with the exception of its enemies sweeping on to-

wards ever more democratic ideals; it is impossible to doubt that morality moves forward; that a divine purpose runs through the ages; and that this purpose will inevitably bring about a better world order. With this conviction, born not only of a sense of the justice of our cause, but of a sense of the presence in the historical process of a God who is more than a metaphysical formula, we face the sacrifices which the crisis of to-day demands. We who believe in evolution cannot doubt that the nations who stand for these goals toward which human history points are on God's side. In this confidence we find strength to make the sacrifices that the protection of the choicest blessings of humanity demands. We dare to protect our nation as an agent of a cosmic God. As we summon from the past the noble army of those who have kept their faith in a God of justice and of goodness, even though they themselves perished because of their faith, we join in the Marseillaise of Christian experience,—“Seeing that we are compassed about by so great a crowd of the veterans of the faith, we lay aside every weight and the sin that so easily besets us, and run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus, the captain and perfecter of our faith.” And so singing we carry on!

III

Religion can serve patriotism by freeing it from vindictiveness and personal hatreds.

Nationalism in its worst aspects has been hardly more than arrogance and contempt. To despise one's neighbors, belittle their achievements in science and art, accuse them of moral turpitude, degeneracy and hypocrisy, has been the consistent policy of Germany. "We are morally and intellectually superior to other nations," wrote Professor Lasson in 1914, "we are without equals." "It is not true," declares Wolfgang Eisenhart, "that all nations have the same right of existence. There are decadent nations, falling into moral decay; these in the tribunal of history have forfeited the right to their own national existence and must make room for the higher morality of another nation destined to dominion."

A nation possessed of such views of other nations not only systematically educates its citizens to hate successively the various countries with which it is at war, but it distributes this collective passion until individual Germans hate individual Englishmen and Americans. The treatment accorded conquered lands and prisoners of war brings German vindic-

tiveness into the clearest light. Hatred has become an indispensable part of German patriotism.

Such a debasement of personal morality is difficult to avoid. Few of us can read the verified accounts of German atrocities in every conquered territory without a desire to punish both nation and citizens capable of such deeds. Not to feel hot indignation as we think of the sorrows of Belgians and Frenchmen, Serbians and Poles, Armenians and Bohemians, is unworthy of men who love their fellows.

But religion, if only it be that of Jesus, can keep this indignation from descending into hatred of individuals or even of nations. The task that Germany has set the world is much greater than that of self-protection. It includes also national and individual self-control. No Christian can consistently desire to injure his enemies simply that they shall suffer. To conquer a nation is not necessarily to hate its citizens.

It must be admitted such moral demands are all but beyond human powers. But such an admission is only an argument for a more rigorous loyalty to the morals of Jesus and for a larger influence of his religion. We need divine help if we are to keep our souls clear from individual hate when as citizens we

must hold in a loathing which cannot stop short of destruction any political power brazenly disloyal to human welfare and the God of all mankind. But individual hatred is not national indignation. True as it is that a common hatred is one of the great sources of community action, it is just as true that national indignation, ferocity and relentlessness at the violation of fundamental moral principles both in individual and in national relations, is a call to religion. He who worships the God of love will never be content with a world where divine love is limited to the rescue of souls from hell or even from vulgar sins. He should realize that a national ideal is included in that same holy will. Without such a conviction, our efforts after international morality are as likely to be immoral as are the relations of individuals when moral principles are forgotten, and hatred becomes a motive to action.

Can we then love our enemies? Yes, we can love them, but we cannot like them. Nor need we. Christian love does not condone evil. Jesus insists on no such miracle. To love people is to treat them as we should like to be treated, and to wish them well. If their enmity to us is due to our own wrongdoing, we must remove the cause, cost what it may. If it is due to their wrongdoing, we must try to get

them to abandon their practices. If they then refuse to be reconciled, they are to be ostracized.

That is the plain teaching of Jesus.

But suppose — as is the case — that ostracized evil doers seek to do men harm. Can we love our enemies while they make war upon us? Not if love means affection for them or indifference to their wrongdoing. Love for enemies does not mean that we should suffer them to do others harm; that we should approve their brutality, condone their atrocities, or submit to their oppression. We have a nation to preserve, a civilization, political ideals, and liberties to safeguard.

We shall love the Germans in the sense that we shall be reconciled with them as soon as they convince us that we have done them wrong or they are converted to a regard for human rights and international justice. If they refuse such reconciliation, persist in robbing other nations, justify rape, massacres, deportations, starvation, and terrorization in the name of patriotism, love for them will not lead us to neglect love for their victims. If they threaten the world with the sword, we shall protect the world with the sword.

Love for our enemies is not moral if it deadens our indignation against the crimes they perpetrate.

Love for our enemies cannot make us indifferent to our obligation to protect those who are not our enemies. That too is love, and of the noblest sort.

Love for our enemies will not keep us from killing them if they compel us to choose that as the only way in which to express our love for their victims. We did not choose the method. We tried to bring Germany to a regard for others and its own best inheritance. We turned one cheek and then another. We were forced into war when we sought peace, into violence when we preferred reconciliation, to draw the sword when we pleaded for the olive branch.

Love has stern duties just because it is love. Not to fulfill these duties is injustice to the victims of organized injustice.

We need not hate Germany in the sense that we wish it ill. We have no desire to crush the nation because it is un-Christian. We shall not soil our souls by vengeance. German women shall not suffer at our hands because Belgian women have suffered unmentionable injury from German soldiers. German civilians shall not be shot because Belgian and French civilians have been shot in batches. German workmen and farmers will not be made slaves of martial law because the workmen and farmers of

Belgium, France, Poland, and the Ukraine have been deported and maltreated. Germans need not fear we shall violate treaties because they have made a mockery of treaties.

Indignation and loathing are not hatred. Self-protection is not vindictiveness. National action for the sake of world-peace is not vengeance.

Christians do not hate because they fight. We seek not vengeance but international justice. When peace comes we shall ask no punitive suffering. We shall help Germans when Germans will let us help them. Our sense of justice will extend to them as to all the world.

But such love will not excuse their brutalities or make us indifferent to the danger of the repetition of German crimes.

We shall love our enemies, but we shall not disarm until they are harmless. If they repent and bring forth fruits meet for repentance, we shall welcome their return to civilization.

Until that day we shall fight them. For love that seeks to do men good is cowardice when it refuses to prevent them from doing wrong.

IV

Religion can serve patriotism by furnishing the moral enthusiasm for organizing an international order that shall make nations into moral units.

Morality is not born of abstract theories; but of concrete situations. Individual morality has been made possible because there has been an intimate relationship of individuals in a social order sufficient to build up social situations in which human conduct can be standardized, under the control of the whole of which they are a part. The development of customs and institutions has established sanctions and inhibitions which have gradually replaced the reliance upon brute force with which they may have been originally enforced. The institution of the family has developed a morality of the relation of the sexes, in so far as that relationship is clearly seen to be dependent upon the maintenance of the rights of the home. Even in civilizations where this *patria potestas* has disappeared, the family and particularly the welfare of the child have set certain standards of conduct to which men and women must conform if they are not to suffer social penalties. Honesty is very largely developed in the mutual relations of economic life. Civilizations which have been mili-

tary have emphasized honor rather than honesty, but when transformed by commercial and industrial forces they have magnified individual honesty.

Nations, however, as John Dewey has pointed out, have never been subordinated to group control, other than that of military power. The solidarity of national units in an international society has never been developed. Nor is it likely that the morality of national units will develop until nations act in accordance with the will of a well established world-society. The rise of international law has been a movement in this direction, and, even in its very inchoate situation, is the finest fruit of moral progress. But its development has been consistently hindered by Germany. "For the state," said von Treitschke, the priest and prophet of the Hohenzollern house, "self-assertion is the greatest of the commandments; for it, this is absolutely moral. And for this reason it must be declared that of all political sins the most abominable and the most contemptible is weakness; this is, in politics, the sin against the Holy Ghost." From such a point of view patriotism is without morality. Might is not only right; it obviates the necessity of discussing right. The present war has made clear that there is no social situation sufficiently unified to place

effective inhibition against action in accord with this anti-morality. No less a person than Von Kohler, commonly regarded as one of the world's greatest authorities in the field of international law, has distinctly denied that such law exists. He frankly expresses an anti-social view of national relations thoroughly consistent with the egoistic genius of the German state. International law, he insists, cannot exist until there arises some nation with conscience high enough and power great enough to enforce its decisions upon the actions of other nations. Such a nation he disdainfully refuses to see in Russia or France, Great Britain or America. Germany alone, he holds, is the nation with conscience high enough and power great enough to lay its will on other nations and so build up a genuine international law!

It requires no argument to see that such a position is only a camouflaged plea for conquest. It recognizes no community of practice among nations, no approach to an international consensus. It is simply another way of saying that there must be established a *pax teutonica* in which all nations must yield to the will of a supreme Germany. Such a view is no more moral than that of any tyranny. Its religious basis, if indeed it claims any, is that of faith in an ethnic

god, and its hope for the future rests entirely upon the inability of other nations to coöperate effectively in a world order. It is no wonder that German patriotism is not international, and no wonder that German religion is boastfully tribal.

Over against such a view is to be set the expectation thrust upon us by a study of actual human history. The rise of democracies and the spread of representative and responsible government over nearly all the world not ruled by Germany are evidences that we already possess an incipient social morality in which the units shall be nations, and in which the controlling social unity is born of national activity. The question as to how far the ideals of individual morality can be carried into the unborn group morality is one which the future alone can decide. But although we cannot see just what this outcome will be, we can at least see the task. The League of Nations of which the democratic states are speaking is certainly the most workable proposal which has yet been made in this connection. That it must at the start rest upon force is no argument against it. The choice is simply as to whether this force shall be used by nations irresponsible to their world, or whether, like the police power of the modern state, it shall be used by the world for the

purpose of establishing the sanctions and inhibitions of an international morality. The precise steps which can be taken for the bringing to pass of such an ideal await the decision of the future. But one thing is beyond fair question: such a League of Nations will require something more than means to delay war by economic boycott and military hindrance. Just as religion has served as the great foundation of individual morality, so must religion serve as the basis of the new international morality.

The foundations for an international morality, I repeat, are already laid. It is no accident that nations which have shaped their recent development upon the principles of democracy should to-day be struggling to restrain the aggression of the anti-democratic government of Germany. The beginnings of a League of Nations committed to the maintenance of peace already exist. France, Great Britain, and the United States for more than a century have ordered their relations according to an ever increasing recognition of moral law. As they have grown democratic they have recognized each other's rights. From their intercourse has sprung a group of precedents which have acquired with them all but final authority. In the present war, during our neutrality, Great Britain appealed against us to

decisions establishing our claims against Englishmen. But Germany has consistently refused such recognition. "We are glad," said Wilhelm Herrman to a colleague of mine years ago, "to have republican principles grow among other nations, for they will grow less efficient in war." As Americans we have no reason to lament that our nation has attempted to live like a gentleman among other nations. Our only regret is that our optimism blinded us from seeing that German patriotism was socialized highway robbery. The Monroe Doctrine may have sprung from motives of self-protection, but thanks to the coöperation of other great democracies, it has included also the protection of weaker neighbors. That is a precedent for the internationalism of the future. It is a new group-morality in which nations are the individual actors. It will grow dominant as nations respect the ideals of Christianity.

The emphasis here is upon actual religion rather than upon a philosophy of religion or upon a theology. The ideals of Christianity must needs be operative, but the propaganda of Christianity as an organized religion will be secondary to these ideals. The one great demand will be for a God equal to the task which such an international morality proposes.

Such a God cannot be the property of any one nation or of any one civilization. The God of the world must be greater than the gods of the nations. He must be the cosmic God, whose will in human history is consistent with its own operation in other aspects of our cosmic life.

The moral content given to the idea of such a God cannot be drawn from any highly nationalized religion. A nationalized idea of God will lead to international polytheism. It is a tribute to the higher religious thinking of the democratic nations that in this war we hear no appeal to the old English God, the old French God, the old Italian God, or the old American God. Such appeals are limited wholly to a people who, finding no moral leadership in a governing class besotted with a belief in materialistic evolution, seek to reënforce the passion of an atavistic patriotism by calls upon Odin, old Fritz, and the German God. Puritans carried their guns to church to protect them from Indians; Germans draw "the shining sword" to force "*kultur*" upon what to them is a barbarian world.

It is, of course, clear enough that a patriotism which is belligerently national can have little use for a God of all the nations. The God of Jesus can

make no appeal to the German, unless it be to that sentimental piety of Germany that refuses to look upon problems of religion as other than that of the individual life and the preparation for the bliss of heaven. International morality must rest upon the will of a God who is the property of no nation, but who is the father of all men. How else can we gain a true sense of national sin? How else can we see that war is a product of some nation's immoral lust for wealth and power? Without a God of the world, we are at the mercy of a religion prostituted to nationalism. We dare then not pray for justice, for justice must mean that unjust national policies are doomed. A God carried like the Ark into battle by only one army is chained to a nation's cannon and is not worth praying to. We need a God who can further righteousness, not merely give victory to His proprietors.

When men are ready to submit their differences to the court of super-national morality, religion and patriotism are sobered and hallowed. To such men war is not something to be planned but to be avoided. They will not want their country to win regardless of justice. And if war, through no fault of theirs, comes, they will not pray for the victory of their

nation but for the victory of the principles of justice their nation has embodied in its institutions and its policies.

A patriotism that is thus inspired by the God of the universe, revealed as love as well as law, is a patriotism that the world has not fully reached. But it is a patriotism that is in the making. We can already see it as one studies the voluminous religious literature put out by Englishmen since the outbreak of the war. It is this plea for international morality on the basis of Christian ideals that the Germans delight to call hypocrisy! By the same token the refusal of an honest man not to steal is hypocrisy to a highwayman!

Nothing better expresses the difference in the two types of patriotism than the refusal of Germany to find in Christianity a basis for international policy. Germans have appealed to Cæsar. To a greater than Cæsar they must go.

Swept into a defensive war we sought to avoid by appeals to a moral sense we persistently believed the German government possessed, we need to believe in a God as noble as the ideals for which we fight. For us to carry on this war in the interest of the rights of other nations and at the same time attempt to nerve ourselves by prayer to military con-

quest would be indeed immoral. A world that is to be made safe for democracy must be a world that is consciously seeking help of a God who is superior to national policies.

It is here that the church has one of its greatest opportunities and tasks. It must champion the value and function of ideals in national life. German writers frankly call such a belief "sentimentality." But we know better. Moral and religious ideals are more than soft-heartedness. We shall shrink from the desperate task of protecting the beginnings of a better world order if our idealism is weakened by a conception of God and of religion which is indifferent to the moral tasks of a social group acting as a unit. To a genuinely Christian soul the thought of taking the life of another person is abhorrent. But a patriotism which refuses to fight to establish international peace and to protect liberty because of its dislike of violence is æstheticism. We must learn that the God of love has no use for the individual who treats his ideals as a luxury and his social duty as inferior to the enjoyment of such ideals. Internationalism must be based on a morality, not generically different from that of the individual life, but in which these ideals are conceived as belonging to a nation as a whole. And

this morality must be given drive and passion by faith in a God who is a God of international relations.

V

Finally, religion must teach patriotism to see that it is better to give justice than to fight for rights.

We have already seen that the great causes of war are desire for conquest and economic advantage. If once any sort of international morality be developed, conquest and economic growth at the expense of other nations must cease. Such an ideal for national action involves the national sacrifice which will be the supreme test of a nation's soul. A small nation may be content to remain a small nation, provided only that it is permitted to manage its own affairs; but a strong nation will find it difficult not to use its strength for its own advantage. International competition, the ambition of rulers and commercial classes will combine to decry any appeal to generosity as impracticable. But until a nation develops an ability to withhold its hand from universal success, war will be inevitable. Nations will arm to protect themselves against nations in proportion as they suspect an unwillingness to recognize their own right to political and economic self-deter-

mination. So long as we dare not trust the morals of our neighbors' ambitions we shall arm ourselves against them. No morality can be really established until the principles of democratizing privilege among nations complement the democratizing of privilege between individuals. But any such advance in the relation of nations means that the economic policies of nations must themselves be controlled by principles of justice. The issue is not one of abstract ethical theory, but one of business policies.

How far shall a nation proceed in undermining another nation's foreign trade? How far shall nations establish tariffs intended to cripple the commerce of other nations? What shall be a nation's policy in the shipment of its products to other nations?

Such questions as these touch the very soul of a nation's life. It is easier to fight for an abstract principle than to neglect an opportunity to grow rich. The task of the religious teacher will be vastly more complicated as the sense of international morality develops, for he will be no longer dealing with the simple if perplexing problems of individual conduct, but with the highly complicated question of the priority of moral obligations on the part of a nation. Shall a nation deliberately adopt an inter-

national policy which will prevent its citizens growing as rich as the citizens of more favored nations? War and peace as well as morals may hang on the answer. Nor can the right answer be given until a people's estimate of its place in world politics is intelligently moral.

Democracy in its triumph is exposed to temptations from which democracy struggling for existence is free. The possession of power always brings new moral problems. A nation conscious of its sincere desire to benefit other nations, but forced to maintain that duty by war, must always guard itself against the temptation to make those whom it defeats the victims of its own powers. A patriotism that is without the capacity to sacrifice is an un-Christian patriotism. Nor does patriotism need religion only in these national sacrifices. No Christian heart has escaped the inner struggle born of the knowledge that a war for the maintenance of human rights means sorrow and suffering and death for those it loves. How many of us during the last few months have found ourselves crying out in agony against the horror of a situation which robs nations of millions of their finest lives, and brings sorrow to millions of innocent hearts! The hideousness of the moment is too great for words. To describe it is

impossible. Yet we, like other nations, have reached this Calvary. But our sacrifices are not selfishness. We pray to our God for victory and for the protection of those who are dear to us, not because we wish to gain more territory or indemnities. It is impossible for me to understand how a genuinely Christian soul can pray for the success of its nation's army when it knows that success means the horrors of Belgium, and Poland, and Serbia, and Armenia. How can any person, be he never so patriotic, justify a prayer that God should be on the side of those who undertake to crush weaker people, loot their resources, and deport men and women into slavery tempered only by disease and death? That such a patriotism leads to sacrifice cannot be denied, but it is a sacrifice which the savage can duplicate, accompanied by a brutality of which a savage would be ashamed.

Those of us who this day share a world-struggle in which our sons are offering their lives without thought of national aggrandizement, solely for the protection of human rights, can have no such qualms of conscience as we look to God for comfort and courage in our moments of sacrifice. For such a patriotism is sacrificial in the truly Christian sense. The brutality of the battle field has been thrust upon

us. The need that our victory should bring sorrow to other lives is not of our making. We train our armies to do their terrible duties, not that we may glory in their victory, but rather because we have been forced to see that this is the only method by which the will of God can be done. Sad and tragic as is the moment, we dare lift our hearts unafraid to the God of justice. Our sacrifice and the sacrifice of those who are dearer to us than life itself, are a part of that strange process in which evil must be repressed in vicarious suffering in order that the good already accomplished may be preserved and extended.

In such moments we can look to the God of battles no more than we can look to Moloch. We willingly bear our share of suffering, looking for help to Him who uplifts those who consecrate themselves to the cause of establishing justice. Our national life becomes ennobled as we pray for victory. Our national soul becomes chastened as we find ourselves suffering for the cause of others. We find ourselves looking to the Christ of Calvary no longer as one who in some mysterious fashion offers sacrifice to divine honor, but as one who has revealed the divine will for the progress of fraternity. To the God of Jesus we pray, not to the God of the Judges;

to the God who carries us forward through our suffering to a larger realization of national mission and to a nobler vision of international morality.

If we speak less boastfully of such a God than does the German emperor of "the old German God," it is because our hearts are hushed in the solemnity of our new faith. Our patriotism is ennobled not alone by our suffering, but by the hope that we are carrying on the divine will which ultimately will be done upon earth. Our patriotism looks to no tribal God, nor even a *Weltgeist* enmeshed ultimately in a national *Kultur*. Rather while our hearts are filled with groanings that cannot be uttered do we face the horrors wrought by a patriotism that has discarded the ideals of the one and only God, and seek to bear bravely the anxiety and the sorrow of the day. For we are convinced that out from this moment of struggle there shall come a patriotism that dares pray and fight for a nation re-dedicated to human welfare, both within and without its boundaries.

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